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Chapter Six 
The Pattern Stops Here? 
Counter-Inductive Thinking, Counter-Intuitive Ideas,  
and Cognitive Science of Religion 
 
“No. There it will break down…. No Induction. Terror. That is, as it were, 
part of the substance of the belief.”1 —Ludwig Wittgenstein, Lectures on 
Religious Belief 
 
What is meant by “Science of Religion”? 
Cognitive science of religion (hereafter CSR) is a relatively new field of research, at this writing 
about 25 years old.2 CSR has been a source of interest by religious and non-religious academics 
alike, with some of its biggest conferences held at religiously-affiliated colleges.3Justin Barrett 
defines CSR as an attempt to scientifically account for patterns of social expression often 
deemed religious. Dimitris Xygalatas defines CSR as an empirically-based study of mental 
capacities and processes that underlie recurrent patterns of religious thought and behaviour. As 
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an experimentally-focused human science, CSR researchers frame specific hypotheses that allow 
for testable predictions. These hypotheses might concern psychological and evolutionary 
mechanisms of belief formation, maintenance, and revision. They might concern cognitive or 
evolutionary explanations for why religious beliefs and practices emerge and persist, based on 
dynamics of ordinary cognition.  
In the 2013 inaugural issue of the Journal for the Cognitive Science of Religions the editors 
lay out some of the core questions CSR studies: “How are religious concepts generated, 
acquired, represented and transmitted?,” and “What are the cognitive structures governing and 
constraining these processes, and how have these structures been shaped?” CSR researchers, they 
write, “aim to shed light both on the proximate psychological mechanisms underpinning 
religious belief and behaviour, and on the ultimate evolutionary forces that sustain religious 
representations.”4  
In these respects, CSR remains consonant with Hume’s approach in his The Natural 
History of Religion, which sought a fuller understanding of religious expressions by 
distinguishing two different questions, that concerning the reasonableness of religious credences, 
and that concerning their etiology or causal origins: 
As every enquiry, which regards Religion, is of the utmost importance, there 
are two questions in particular, which challenge our principle attention, to 
whit, that concerning its foundation in reason, and that concerning its origin in 
human nature.5 
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While no doubt steeped in theory, CSR as I understand it takes no stance on the question 
of realism or non-realism about religious use of language. As a science, CSR concerns itself with 
the second of Hume’s questions –origins in human nature, and not with either the first question 
about rationality or justification, or with questions of metaphysics. It assumes no necessary 
incompatibility of the CSR literature with theism. The questions of its implications for questions 
of religious realism or anti-realism, and for the existence of supernatural occurrences go beyond 
science proper.  But issues that are beyond the scope of science to investigate directly are often 
pursued by philosophers, theologians, or others who might draw from CSR research.  
Helen De Cruz, a philosopher, asks, “Does the second question have an impact on the 
first, i.e., does the causal, psychological origin of religion have an impact on the reasonableness 
of religious beliefs?”6 The short answer is that they may, but that normative issues like those 
about reasonableness and justification are basically philosophical rather than scientific questions. 
Secular and religious thinkers who debate the force of etiological challenges to the well-
foundedness of religious beliefs would do well to be empirically informed, but these debates are 
carried on beyond the boundaries of science. So also, whether serious de jure and de facto 
challenges arise from CSR is not itself a question for CSR, for the simple reasons that these are 
moral, epistemological, and metaphysical questions.7 CSR researchers typically hold that CSR is 
committed to no position theological or a-theological on the existence of divine or supernatural 
forces.8 CSR is concerned with naturalistic explanation, and so with the causal mechanisms or 
processes underlying visible manifestations of religion. But as Justin Barrett puts it, CSR is 
methodologically a-teleological in its approach to causes; it is neutral to and not eliminative of 
another whole order of causes asserted by theologians as higher or deeper.9  
4 
 
Robert McCauley writes in “Cognitive Science and the Naturalness of Religion,” that his 
approach to religious phenomena finds the persistence of religion attributable to “the cognitive 
naturalness of religious ideas, i.e. attributable to the readiness, the ease, and the speed with which 
human minds acquire and process popular religious representations.”10 CSR seeks explanations 
of cultural phenomena in terms of acquisition, representation and transmission involving 
cognitive capacities. These evolutionary and cognitive approaches display less interest in study 
of cultural differences, but need not exclude them. 
Before framing the main thesis for this final chapter, we need to say more about how, in the 
present study, evolutionary and cognitive approaches are connected with the previous chapter’s 
focus on comparative fundamentalism. Barrett and McCauley both recognize the need for 
balance between the particular and universal (or generic) in the study of religious ideas. How 
ideas transfer also needs to be balanced in this way. There is no simple answer as to whether to 
study religion or religions. One aim of CSR to which I hope this chapter will contribute is to 
disentangle the relationship between cognition and culture in religious representations. But Justin 
Barrett seems correct that even within CSR there has been something akin to a nature-nurture 
debate.11  
The nativist strand in this debate strips away cognitive specificity to explain the propensity 
for religious credences in terms of a universal cognitive architecture. The nativist the universal 
side—what is universal to the human condition. As an example, researchers in CSR sometimes 
apply dual – processing models of thought drawn from social psychology and neuroscience. We 
all share the features of the ‘old’ mind and depend heavily its intuitive, heuristic Type 1 
reasoning. This type of reasoning is fast and frugal, so we are naturally hesitant to ‘de-couple’ 
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from it. Our reliance on it many times that we should have employed some slower and more 
methodical dispositions of Type 2 explains many deviations with normatively correct reasoning. 
At the nurturist end of this debate, emanating mostly from social psychology and cultural 
anthropology, we find a different emphasis: one that highlights religious specificity, as studied 
through ritual and community, culturally-conditioning of belief, and the politics of identity. 
These interests in general cognitive explanation and studies of more ethnographically specific 
levels of description are each legitimate, and necessary for the development of the field. 
Numerous scholars are combining aspects of each, but balancing them theoretically remains a 
challenge for researchers. There are many reasons why. 
According to researchers focusing on what is universal in our cognitive architecture, too 
much emphasis on differences in religious belief and practice is seen as an unwarranted 
impediment to inquiry. Todd Tremlin writes that,  
Among the roadblocks to a scientific study of religion is the long – standing 
view that religious thought is somehow unlike other kinds of thought, and that it 
therefore cannot be explained in the same way that ordinary ideas can be… 
Another traditional misconception of religious studies is that the tremendous 
diversity within religion found around the world makes it impossible either to 
generalize about human religiosity or to construct a single explanatory theory.12  
CSR does not approach religion as an evolved adaptation or as employing cognitive 
architecture specialized for the acquisition of religious behavior. Rather than there being any 
special module for religiosity, many CSR researchers share the by-product thesis: that thesis that 
religious ideas arise as a by-product of cognitive modules and mechanisms that also have quite 
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unrelated adaptive functions. Robert McCauley understands religious ideas as resting on normal 
mental structures and processes. The processes on which CSR has focused most, ToM (theory of 
mind) and HADD (hyperactive agency detective device), are ones originally evolved to serve 
different though functionally related purposes.13  
Comparative fundamentalism (CF) primarily comes out of religious studies and subfields like 
comparative religious ethics. Scholars in these fields might worry that too much emphasis on 
generic processing and evolutionary explanations might be an impediment to studying the 
religious behavioral patterns and social dynamics they are most interested in. So as we continue 
to develop our inductive risk toolkit, this chapter will propose specific ways through which this 
general-specific contrast between CSR and Religious Studies can be mediated, and CSR and CF 
more closely connected with each other. There might be numerous ways in which the general 
and specific might be balanced in CSR research. But I will argue that philosophy of luck as 
developed in the first two chapters, and religious fideism and counter-inductive thinking as 
studied in the third and fourth chapters, both raise pertinent questions that CSR can best address. 
These same concerns with strong fideism and its demonstrable connections with counter-
inductive thinking can also bring CSR and CF into closer connection with each other. 
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Vainio’s Christian Philosophic Appropriation and Critique of CSR 
Epistemology and ethics are fields that prescribe norms of thought and action. Cognitive 
and social psychology help explain the mechanisms that cause us to deviate either consciously or 
unconsciously from normative principles of logic or ethics, and in some cases to flout them more 
or less predictably. These sciences are in turn informing what Jack Lyons and Barry Ward call 
the “new critical thinking,” by which they mean a pedagogy that doesn’t only study formal 
reasoning and informal fallacies, but also recognizes that  “[M]any of our mistakes are not 
caused by formal reasoning gone awry, but by our bypassing it completely. We instead favor 
more comfortable, but often unreliable, intuitive methods.”14  
My point is that only by more closely aligning philosophical normativity with 
psychological study can we hope to improve real world critical thinking, as is crucially 
necessary to address many problems that we face. A growing number of theologians and 
religious philosophers would agree. Empirically-informed religious thinkers like Olli-Pekka 
Vainio in his recent book, Disagreeing Virtuously: Religious Conflict in Interdisciplinary 
Perspective (2017) are well aware of the impact of biases and heuristics on human cognition, and 
are as interested as any secular philosopher in the implications of the human sciences for 
religious epistemics. Vainio acknowledges that “quite a large amount of our religious cognition 
is channelled through Type 1 cognitive processes. Even if this does not automatically cause 
massive suspicion, it may cause theological problems within religious systems.”15 
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Following upon his earlier study of the variety of forms of fideism, Vainio’s approach in 
Disagreeing Virtuously emphasizes that “the problematic elements of religion are usually those 
that are shared by every human being, regardless of their worldview. If there’s something that we 
should worry about, it is the dynamics to create and enforce in-group/out-group distinctions, be 
they religious or secular.”16 Subject to these qualifications, Vainio is interested in defending 
virtuous disagreement among religious adherents, and between the religious and non-religious.  
So Vainio takes a pro-attitude towards interdisciplinary dialogue between theologians, 
philosophers, and psychologists over the effects of psychology on what he calls people’s 
different doxastic policies or theological methods. He aims to improve the dialogue between 
these parties by developing a “dynamic view” of disagreement informed by the human sciences, 
on the one hand, and virtue theory on the other. 
I highly admire Vainio’s approach in Disagreeing Virtuously, and how this Christian 
thinker appropriates CSR to help explain religious violence and to defend toleration and the 
importance of continuous dialogue across traditions. Since we have both developed virtue-
theoretic accounts of doxastic responsibility, there is a good deal of common-ground in our 
projects in philosophy of religion. This said, I will take issue with three specific positions Vainio 
takes, and discussing these will lead us afterwards to want to look more carefully at so-called 
‘debunking’ explanations, and at the relationship between more qualified de jure and more 
sweeping de facto challenges. 
Firstly, while Vainio’s book provides many rich thick descriptions of the role of 
particular intellectual and moral virtues in a religious life, he defends the reasonableness of the 
exclusivist response to religious multiplicity on one of the few pages where he engages it 
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directly. I will not here repeat the problems raised for that response in this book. But I will 
briefly respond that Vainio’s endorsement of reasonable or virtuous exclusivism is logically 
inconsistent with the account he gives of the virtues.  
Secondly, I will defend CSR against Vainio’s charge that there is a standard model in 
CSR that applies dual-process theory in a reductive way, treating religious phenomena largely or 
wholly as emanations of Type 1 thinking, with all its flaws. This issue will open out into a 
broader discussion of the relationship between de jure and de facto challenges, their different 
intended targets, and the conditions under which the presence of a plausible and sufficient 
naturalistic explanation of a phenomena is sufficient grounds to slide to the stronger de facto 
challenge. With this latter topic, I will also be able to develop some of the parallels between my 
approach in this book, and Hume’s approach to miracles. 
Thirdly, I will take issue with how Vainio treats religious diversity that arises from the 
same or similar belief-forming functions. Vainio asks whether NERBs –naturalistic explanations 
of religious beliefs– present any very direct challenge to the attitude of religious exclusivists. But 
his argument that they do not present a serious challenge relies upon a sense of exclusivism 
(‘open’ doctrinal exclusivism) far weaker than the salvific exclusivism we seen numerous 
examples of. So his answer I will argue comes too easily, since NERBs challenge naturalistically 
unsupported asymmetries in trait-ascription, and there are far more of these in full-blooded 
salvific exclusivism. I will argue that NERBs pose a special challenge where the same belief – 
formation method manifests in the form of religious diversity, and another where this method 
manifests in infallibilist beliefs and exclusivist attitudes, which set each against the others as 
competitors for one true path to truth and/or salvation.17  
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The first issue concerns Vainio’s description and dismissal of what he perceives as a 
standard model in CSR, a model he says aims to associate all or most religious thinking with 
Type or System 1 processing. Part of his complaint regards CSR’s studies of “theological 
incorrectness,” and its primary focus on “popular religiosity.”18 This exhibits, he thinks, a 
disregard for how religious thinkers engage Type or System 2 reasoning, reflecting deeply on 
their beliefs and their causes, and improving their epistemic standing with respect to them. 
Vainio cites Justin Slone’s book Theological Incorrectness: Why Religious People Believe What 
They Shouldn’t (2004) as indicative of this distortion of religious views. “It is not clearly the case 
that religious believers are not engaging in higher and refined forms of cognition, or that 
theologian’s ideas are systematically disregarded.” This reductive image of CSR that Vainio 
thinks is the standard model is one where “religion is almost purely a matter of type 1 cognition,” 
and where type 2 cognition (theology and philosophy) functions as “post hoc rationalizations of 
fundamentally irrational folk beliefs.”19 Vainio is more generally concerned that “CSR writers 
have different views about the religious relevance of their theories, but negative relevance is 
often simply assumed without further argument.”20 When researchers like the ones Vainio cites 
describe religious beliefs or behavior as irrational, is it because they are already assuming the de 
facto view that religious beliefs are untrue? By contrast, Vainio argues that even if people may 
not always be virtuous in belief acquisition, they can and typically do become so in the course of 
second-order reflection; this reflection, he points out, often works to raise their interest in and 
conformity with more systematic theological thinking.21  
 There are clearly some valid points here, and the line between CSR or any science and a 
realist or anti-realist metaphysic concerning their subject matter, ought to be maintained. We can 
agree that how study of group biases applies to religious identity, teachings, and dynamics is an 
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open question. But while there might well be examples of it, most CSR integration of dual 
process cognitive theory does not appear to beg these questions, or to make for a valid target for 
Vainio’s criticism. Aggressive atheists or ‘debunkers’ might appropriate CSR data for their own 
arguments; CSR researchers might not feel themselves bound by the “methodological 
agnosticism” taught to religious studies majors. But among CSR researchers in the field today I 
doubt that there are many examples of the reductive stance Vainio describes. As a prime 
example, McCauley’s CSR applies dual-process cognitive science, it clearly allows the 
reflective, ‘slow’ thinking that Vainio calls upon religious adherents to apply to their beliefs. The 
explicit religious credences adopted and transmitted by the religious, McCauley argues, are 
generally those in line with what is maturationally natural. We only need common or universal 
human cognitive architecture to explain why maturationally natural ideas, when processed 
through domain-specific modules or belief-forming functions, become especially appealing 
options for adoption and transmission across time. Evolutionary perspectives draw on universal 
causes rather than proximate environmental ones, but more reflective thinking may always be 
applied to one’s beliefs, however acquired. 
Type 1 processing is sometimes related to automaticity. Automaticity is rapid and 
effortless cognition that operates without conscious awareness or deliberative control. But these 
faculties are not always unreliable, nor do they threaten a credit theory of knowing. Clea Rees 
and Jonathan Webber’s “Automaticity in Virtuous Action” (2014) develop the specific 
contributions of automaticity for moral and intellectual virtue. The automaticity and/or heuristic 
aspects of our thinking often support, rather than just threaten, the development of habits and 
dispositions of critical thinkers.  I relatedly argue elsewhere (2017c) that autonomous processing 
can be supportive of the virtues, but also that heuristic reasoning becomes unreliable when what 
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West, Toplak and Stanovich (2008) term “fluid rationality” or higher-order critical reasoning 
dispositions are instead called for in one’s epistemic context or problem-situation. Persons who 
lack the ability for sustained de-coupling will fail reasoning tasks that the engagement of their 
fluid rationality would allow them to succeed with. Of course, the normal development of the 
critical reasoning dispositions of fluid rationality involves recognizing and applying inductive 
norms (causal reasoning, generalization, and analogy).22 
The philosophical and theological implications of dual-process theory, or the ecological 
nature of human cognition, are certainly debatable. I believe there are strong normative 
implications that both fields have yet to fully come to grips with. While it is a bit of a digression, 
let me add a suggestion about how theologians and philosophers can at least better recognize 
these normative implications. This suggestion is especially of value if the disputants are talking 
past one another. I suggest taxonomizing issues about naturalism and normativity by crossing the 
distinctions between the etiological and the axiology, and between the deep (ancient; general) 
and the shallow (acquired; learned; normative). What I have in mind is one dimension running 
between that which is buried deep or only shallow in the human psyche, and the other dimension 
running between the etiological (order of causes) and the axiological (order of values).  
Thinking in maturationally natural ways is etiologically deep, but typically axiologically 
shallow, since its specific content is conditioned and filtered by culture. Thinking draws attention 
to propensities of mind that are etiologically deep because rooted in our ‘old mind,’ in ‘online’ 
cognition; but it is axiologically shallow because it draws norms from culture, and refuses or is 
in tension with logical and epistemological norms. Reasoning and the acquired critical thinking 
dispositions are just the opposite. They are axiologically shallow, and have the characteristic 
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McCauley attributes to the “practiced natural.” These norms are correctives to biases where they 
intrude on inquiry. We have to value and habituate ourselves to them, and habituation is a matter 
of practice; this does not come easily or naturally, and until internalized as good habits of 
thought there may be much psychological resistance to them.  
The upshot for our present discussion is that CSR’s concern with universal cognitive 
architecture is a concern for etiologically deep sources of religious ideas, and not with what is 
etiologically shallow in the sense of ideas acquired along with culture, or corrected religion-
specific theologies or rituals. This contrast, additionally, should not raise flags that religion is 
being denied recognition as a source in people’s lives of core values. That would be a claim 
about axiology. Facility with theological reasoning, and the ability of some not to stray as others 
do from the content and norms of theological correctness within a tradition may be well and 
good for the individual. But this is a different question than that of belief acquisition and transfer. 
Ideally, my taxonomy enables clearer location of the points of contention in the debate over 
CSR, such as debate over availability of NERBs for beliefs in different domains, and their 
implications in particular for how we understand religious differences. Table 4.1 includes some 
brief examples of how this classification works. 
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                 Deep                                            Shallow 
 
 
Etiologically 
--Mere behaviors 
--Type 1 processing 
--Heuristic thinking of the old 
mind 
--Appeal of  maturationally 
natural ideas 
 
--Intentional actions 
--Type 2 processing 
--Self-conscious employment of a 
doxastic strategy  
--Fluid rationality and critical 
thinking dispositions 
 
 
 
 
Axiologically 
--Pro-social moral emotions 
--Anti-social emotions/Thanatos 
or other recurrent regressive 
values  
--Self-interest; ingroup-outgroup 
dynamics 
 
--Societal expectations and 
assigned social roles 
--Culturally recognized virtues 
and vices  
--Posited universal moral 
principles or rights. 
--Evolved scientific and 
disciplinary norms  
 
Table 4.1  Organization of the Philosophical Implications of Dual-process Theory  
The organization of issues according to this taxonomy also allows us to parse concerns 
about safety, sensitivity, and epistemic risk (Chapter 2). It is not enough to counter etiological 
challenges based on CSR research as Vainio does by pointing out how people may improve their 
theological reasoning within the faith tradition in which they are raised. The question of safe and 
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sensitive belief acquisition is an externalist concern, and this is why the post hoc use of reason to 
defend or extend beliefs acquired on another basis is indeed philosophically significant, as we 
have previously argued. Those processes which are maturationally natural can be anticipated to 
continue to impact thought and culture, widely construed, even if they are not reliable processes 
in the sense of giving rise to beliefs that are truth-apt. One might correctly say that this is true for 
the full range of our controversial views, if it is true at all. But the self-reflection of a religious 
agent subsequent to an act of testimonial authority assumption will not very directly affect the 
external concerns with safety and sensitivity on which etiological challenges may be based. It 
cannot, because these are not even in the same ballpark: No appeal to theological systematization 
and reflection within a faith tradition has the power to later transform intervening or 
environmental veritic luck into benign evidential luck. Etiological challenges as framed by 
philosophers instead need to be met with specific reasons why the good religious luck in the 
etiology of a belief is benign rather than malign. Then the debate can truly be engaged. But to 
treat theological reflection as upgrading positive epistemic status, or as a sufficient 
demonstration of the agent’s intellectual virtue, would be to assume that internal cogitations 
negate externalist concerns with veritic luck. That, I take it, is logically precluded by the external 
and modal status of veritic luck. 
The second concern I raised above is the position Vainio takes on how NERBs are related 
to recognized religious diversity. He makes the blanket claim that  
 
NERBs do not bring anything new that would dramatically change the situation. 
We already knew that diversity existed; suggesting a cognitive mechanism that 
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brings about diversity does not alter the basic premises of the solutions that 
Christian theologians have already suggested in the course of history.23  
 
Cognitive science of religions raises an interesting philosophical question: If we are able 
to tell a plausible naturalistic story about how religiosity emerged in the course of human 
evolution, have we provided a debunking account, one that reveals the true nature of religion as 
something produced by impersonal forces of evolution? Vainio insists not, and this is consistent 
with our own non-reductionist view. Truth-tracking and fitness-tracking functions of belief are 
not identical, but neither are they mutually exclusive categories. Vainio may be right that 
“throughout their history, theistic religions have formulated answers that take into account the 
diversity of religions in a way that reflects their core beliefs.” According to the author, 
“contemporary CSR provides nothing that would make religious noncognitivism or anti-realism 
more plausible than they were before.”24  
To support this conclusion, Vainio has his readers focus on a peculiar claim made by 
Barrett: that if NERBs produced religious uniformity among humans, this might actually be a 
ground for antirealist. Vainio then reasons:  
 
   For Barrett, NERBs combined with the unity of religions and worldviews would 
count against theological realism. In order for NERBs to acquire their debunking 
power, we would need a uniform belief – formation process that produces 
demonstrably false beliefs, not supported by epistemic arguments. So if NERBs 
plus uniformity would be more problematic for exclusivists, we can conclude that 
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NERBS plus diversity does not have an immediate effect on the evidential force 
of the exclusivist claims. Therefore, the debunking thesis fails.25  
 
Vainio’s inference regarding the combination of NERBS and religious diversity, and his 
subsequent dismissal of their relevance to exclusivist responses to religious multiplicity, seems 
far too quick. I will argue that it is quite unsound: The relationship between NERBS and 
religious diversity is neither so uniform nor as settled as Vainio here asserts. Let me explain why. 
Firstly, the application of NERBS likely does not require Barrett’s somewhat quirky 
claim in the first place. Vainio might just be trying to argue on Barrett’s premises, but imagining 
exclusivism — even doctrinal exclusivism — together with complete uniformity of belief makes 
no sense to me. Who would these exclusivists be excluding? For on this scenario there are no 
nonbelievers, and the uniformity of belief guarantees that there is only one set of beliefs that 
humans in fact adopt. Secondly, even assuming Barrett’s claim that NERBs plus uniformity of 
religious belief provides the strongest case for anti-realism about religious belief, Vainio ignores 
an important detail in Barrett’s argument: that “beliefs about God’s, souls, and the rest would 
likewise be more suspect if it were discovered that no matter the information available, the mind 
used it to arrive deterministically at such beliefs” (italics added for emphasis).26 This rider makes 
the conditions under which uniform belief would invite skepticism still more hyperbolic. How 
would we ever discover if this odd counter-factual condition, no matter the information 
available, were met? This again makes doubtful Vainio’s unusual view that contrariety somehow 
reduces the plausibility of fictionalism or anti-realism in that domain. As a general point, it 
increases it. Finally, Vainio’s conclusion appears overdrawn because there are clearly conditions 
where a belief forming cognitive mechanism that gives rise to diverse outputs should motivate 
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skepticism about the epistemic status of all, not just some of the generated beliefs. Our study 
focuses not on religious truth and knowledge, but on doxastic responsibility and the intellectual 
viciousness of counter-inductive thinking. Still, we should not shy away from direct examination 
of the relationship between de jure and de facto challenges. 
 This relationship between the two types of challenges, which some recent collections in 
CSR contain interesting papers on, will be the focus of the next section. But throughout the 
course of this book we have been concerned with doxastic methods that generate sharply 
asymmetric moral, epistemic, and theological trait-ascriptions. We termed the production of 
contrariety through symmetrical proximate causes as the main generator of what we earlier 
termed enemy in the mirror effects (EME).  So I do think that religious contrariety generated 
under unsafe or counter-inductive doxastic methods has an immediate effect on the evidential 
force of the exclusivist claims. The question, ‘Are any of them better off?’ naturally arises from 
our Etiological Symmetry thesis (in Chapter 2) plus the multiplicity or diversity it produces. This 
goes quite some distance, we have held, to explaining why exclusivist responses to religious 
multiplicity are far more common in testimonial traditions like those of the Abrahamic religions, 
than, for instance, in mystical or meditational-practice oriented traditions.27 Their mirrored 
vice/bias charges directed at faith-based belief in all alien faith communities makes their case for 
being epistemologically better off than any others, worse. 
When the attitude exhibited by a religious exclusivist or recommended by an apologist is the 
attitude we would say that a biased individual would exhibit, we have the phenomena that we 
have called bias-mirroring. I take it that the exclusivist cannot plausibly deny this of exclusivists 
either of the home religion or of an alien one. But now the question becomes, in an inference to 
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the best explanation, does the self-exception cast in theological terms of divine plan, or the 
NERB provide the better explanation? Following the Diversity Principle as major norm of 
inductive reason, more diverse evidence is normally stronger than less diverse evidence. If the 
majority of religions, those not of the purported true faith, are well-explained by the NERB, there 
is an inductive presumption that describing one’s own religion as the lone exception to 
naturalistic explanation rule does not of itself insulate one from the challenge. In the case of 
explanations involving identity bias one would think rather that religious exclusivism invites 
uniform application, since self-exemption from causes that regularly lead to false religious 
beliefs is close to the very definition of exclusivism. The more numerous the self-exemptors, the 
more likely that all are shaped by the same causal factors. Applying the diversity principle rebuts 
Vainio’s argument, and indicates that the strength of NERBs to motivate debunking explanations 
is a question of inductive strength. The New Problem is then a problem for Vainio insofar as it 
shows that when religious exceptionalism partakes of counter-inductive thinking, the alternative 
naturalistic explanation gains considerable strength.28  
Vainio is probably right that the theological liberalism of a generation ago, perhaps 
exemplified in John Hick’s neo-Kantian ding-an-sich “tried to universalize everything in 
monistic fashion,” while contemporary revisionism, in adopting more aspects of postmodernism, 
steps away from such essentialism and instead acknowledges genuine particularity. Liberal and 
conservative theologians might agree on this, though responses to multiplicity or related issues 
divide them. But we can add to this response to Vainio by relating another recent discussion of 
the reach and limitations of so-called evolutionary debunking arguments. According to P. E. 
Griffiths and John Wilkins (2013), “Evolutionary debunking arguments suggest that the 
evolutionary origins of our cognitive faculties should undermine our confidence in the beliefs 
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which those faculties produce.”29 Evolutionary adaptions may produce beliefs that in some 
domains are truth apt, and in other domains are not. So it is incumbent on evolutionary 
debunking arguments that they have resources to distinguish specific classes of belief for which 
the skeptical argument has force, and other beliefs for which it does not.  
On the third point of contention, Vainio defines exclusivism in terms of its doctrinal, not 
its salvific sense. Many soteriological exclusivists are not also doctrinal exclusivists, and so can 
allow that there may be religious truths to be found outside the home religion. Exclusivism in the 
doctrinal sense is only about religious truth-possession, and so his “open exclusivism,” is a 
watered down version of what most self-described exclusivists hold.30 This has an important 
implication for how Vainio treats NERBs. When he asks whether NERBs present any very direct 
challenge to the attitude of religious exclusivists, he presents exclusivism differently than when it 
implicates the further explanatory asymmetries of religious value and of culpability for unbelief 
that salvific exclusivism ascribes to religious aliens.31 I see NERBs as challenging asymmetries 
not supported by relevant difference reasoning. Salvific exclusivism entails many more relevant 
differences between religious insiders and outsiders than does doctrinal exclusivism. It most 
notably includes that religious aliens lack value in God’s eye, and that they are morally culpable 
for not having taken up the one salvific religious identity. Essentially it is about people and their 
actions, not just about truth taken abstractly. Until Vainio takes up the harder case of salvific (or 
soteriological) exclusivism, I remain unconvinced by Vainio’s treatment of NERBs and his 
conclusion that they raise no new worries for exclusivists. Moreover, I suspect that many of the 
intellectual virtues Vainio so nicely develops in his book, for instance “open-mindedness,” 
“maintaining a critical attitude and public conversation,” “virtuous tolerance” or the idea that 
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inter-religious dialogue has to express intellectual virtues, are either rejected outright or 
implicitly violated in salvific exclusivism.32 
Under what specific conditions might evolutionary explanations ‘debunk’ belief? This is 
a question that Griffiths and Wilkins ask, but that Vainio’s discussion seems to miss due to the 
blanket response tries he makes, that NERBS can never really suggest any new challenges that 
theologians haven’t already thought about and responded to. The authors employ the helpful 
concept of a “Milvian Bridge” for domains in which natural selection will favor the production 
of truth-apt beliefs. They argue that “there is a Milvian Bridge connecting true commonsense 
beliefs to evolutionary success,” while “no Milvian Bridge links true religious beliefs to 
evolutionary success.” What the authors mean is that in the one domain but not the other, it is 
plausible to link true belief with pragmatic success, i.e., to see evolutionary success as grounds 
for attributing truth.33 So as the authors seem right to point out,  
It is an error to contrast truth-tracking with fitness tracking because this treats 
complementary explanations at different levels of analysis as if they were rival 
explanations at the same level of analysis…. ‘Fitness-tracking’ is not an 
alternative to ‘truth-tracking’ because truth-tracking is a property at a lower level 
of explanation… It makes sense to ask if a trait is an adaptation for respiration, or 
for foraging, or for something else. It makes no sense to ask if a trait is an 
adaption ‘for fitness,’ since that is simply to repeat the definition of an 
adaptation—a trait that evolved because it enhanced fitness.34 
So evolutionary debunking arguments that work on universal causes have no force on 
everyday commonsense ideas, or arguably on beliefs obtained through scientific reasoning. But 
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etiological challenges based on an unusual proximate mechanism, like brainwashing, might 
challenge particular beliefs.  Evolutionary debunking may, however, have more force against 
moral beliefs or religious beliefs, again either by domain, or by individuated belief. The success 
of debunking is tied to its ability to target an over-strong realism about the domain to which the 
target belief belongs. Religious beliefs, the authors conclude, “emerge as particularly vulnerable 
to evolutionary debunking arguments…. Current evolutionary theory really does support the 
view that human beings would have religious beliefs even if all religious beliefs were uniformly 
false.” But, they continue, “debunking is not disproving. If there are independent reasons for 
religious belief, their cogency is not removed by the fact that religious beliefs have evolutionary 
explanations.”35 This seems to be a more sound way to approach the special concern that the 
combination of NERBS plus religious diversity raises. But the relation between our de jure 
challenge to the reasonableness of the exclusivist attitude, and a more widely cast de facto 
challenge to beliefs acquired on the basis of testimonial authority assumption invites a more 
direct discussion. 
 
De jure and De facto Challenges: How Related? 
Challenges to a belief can take multiple forms. The literature on so-called debunking 
unfortunately equivocates somewhat between an argument that casts doubt on the doxastic 
responsibility (moral and intellectual virtue) of the agent in coming to hold or maintain the 
belief, and an argument that casts doubt on the truth (or candidacy for truth) of what the agent 
asserts.  
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If ‘debunking explanation’ is defined as covering both de jure and de facto challenges, as 
it seems to in the literature, it is not a very helpful term. While I will not use this term, the 
relationship between de jure and de facto challenges is indeed important question.36 Philip 
Kitcher’s work should be mentioned in this connection. Kitcher’s Terri Lectures makes solid 
points about the symmetry - of - generation thesis (thesis (AS) in Chapter 2). Recall that 
etiological symmetry holds wherever the proximate grounds behind beliefs are of the same 
general type. I see myself as close to Kitcher on this, as well as on his articulation of different 
models of faith with varying degrees of rational respectability (as well as on his clear, strong 
response to Dawkins, Sam Harris, and other “militant modern atheists”).  
However, Kitcher does not develop the further connections that interest us here: how 
asymmetry of content – strong and even polarized contrariety – flows from etiologically 
symmetrical processes, especially in testimonial faith traditions.37 Following upon my response 
to Vainio in the previous section, my thesis is that the combination of etiological symmetry and 
content contrariety is what we need to pay the most attention to. If this combination is quite 
epistemically significant, it is because it exhibits the clearest indicators of counter-inductive 
thinking. But notice also that it is combinations of this sort that also raise the plausibility of 
moving from judging some claims in the domain as untrue while allowing that others are 
possibly true, to judging it more likely that all of them are untrue. The debate over miracle 
claims is a debate where this dynamic of movement from a de jure to a de facto challenge is 
ever-present, so we can develop our thesis further by briefly comparing it with Hume on 
miracles. 
 
24 
 
Hume on Miracles 
In certain respects, my project’s concern with the explanatory asymmetries that power 
apologetics for religious exclusivism also parallels the Humean critique of miracles. The 
relationship between de jure and de facto challenges might be illuminated through this parallel, 
so let us make a brief digression. Hume did not overgeneralize in the way that presents religious 
beliefs as en toto rational or irrational. There are different possible bases for belief, through 
reasoning, experience, testimonial transfer, etc. Hume’s argument starts from an epistemic focus 
on the reasonableness of belief in miracles on the basis of testimony; it focuses on the rational 
credibility of such claims for the recipient of testimony about a miracle event, not for someone 
who purportedly experienced such an event first-personally. The New Problem’s challenge to 
sharply asymmetrical trait-ascriptions basically parallels this. In both cases this is an 
epistemological argument, or what we have called a de jure challenge.  
But notice that Hume’s argument also has potential, whether Hume pushed this line or 
not, for denying the very existence of miracles –a stronger de facto argument. The de facto 
argument concerning miracles, suggested but not fully developed by Hume, holds that while it is 
logically possible that most miracle claims are false while some smaller number of them are true 
— say the miracle events recounted just in religion x’s sacred narratives, uniquely — it is far 
more probable that all of them are false. Somewhat relatedly, in psychology if you design tests to 
look for an effect but in repeated studies do not observe it, this is good evidence that there is no 
such effect. This is no mean appeal to ignorance, but takes place through the search for evidence, 
and by deducing observable consequences from working hypotheses. Moving from absence of 
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evidence to evidence of absence thus seems be part of abductive reasoning; the epistemic import 
of lack of empirical evidence depends upon context, and by no means is always fallacious.38 
Hume’s argument regarding miracles also has versions which draw attention to the 
counter-inductive nature of miracle claims. This comes in two ways: in his analysis of 
testimonial sources of such claims, and in the alternative psychological explanation he offers of 
why miracle claims are often persuasive for recipients of the testimony.39 About the first he 
writes, “When anyone tells me, that he saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately consider 
with myself, whether it be more probable, that this person should either deceive or be deceived, 
or the fact, which he relates, should really have happened.” Beliefs based on human testimony 
varies with people’s experience. “Where this experience is no uniform on any side, it is attended 
with an unavoidable contrariety in our judgments, and with the same opposition and mutual 
destruction of opposites as with every sort of evidence.”40  To respect inductive norms 
concerning the reception of testimony, Hume thinks that we should always reject the miracle 
claim unless the falsehood of the testimony would be more miraculous than the breach of a 
causal regularity. Hume’s own skepticism about the principle of induction has often been cited 
against him where he purports to say that the violation of a law of nature must be highly 
improbable. But Hume does not rely on his epistemological argument alone; he offers multiple 
supporting psychological explanations, explanations that people are motivated thinkers, and are 
driven by “the passion of surprise and wonder, arising from miracles,” leading to their being too 
easily persuaded on the basis of vivid or eloquent testimony.41 My point is not that these 
alternative psychological explanations are correct, but only that the better supported one takes 
them to be, and the closer their fit with the epistemological considerations, the more 
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philosophically motivated would be the assent from a de jure to a de facto challenge to 
miracles.42 
With regard to etiological challenges, it might be suggested that judging the ground for a 
belief to be not just inductively weak, but positively counter-inductive, provides just the kind of 
criteria that might validate assent to the stronger, ‘debunking’ sort of challenge. If so, this may 
be because what we find salient in such cases is not just failure of safety, but of sensitivity. 
Sensitivity demands that if p had been false then the agent in question wouldn’t have believed p 
on the basis on which she actually believes p. Helen De Cruz comments that when people apply 
maturationally natural doxastic methods, the beliefs they acquire are often insensitive. This 
occurs if they “would believe it even if God did not exist – making their belief veritically 
lucky.”43 This is as much to say that sensitivity failure, as distinguished from safety failure, 
engages more directly the truth-aptness debate. Now, it stands to reason that this may be so for 
particular beliefs, or for whole domains of belief/opinion.44 If this is correct then sensitivity 
failure also serves to show when and how far the door is open for a skeptical de facto, in addition 
to a responsibility / rationality focused de jure challenge. 
 
The Religious Credence Thesis: Another Sort of Debunking Argument?  
How should we understand the relationship between de jure and de facto challenges? If 
these two objections are independent of one another then the philosophical success of one of 
these challenges does not guarantee the success of the other. So as a quick example of different 
views of how they relate, it is quite common among nontheists to combine a de jure objection 
that theism is epistemically unacceptable with agnosticism about the de facto objection that 
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theism is false.45 Principled agnostics tend to think that this gives their position the upper hand 
against atheists who may take de facto challenges to falls out of de jure challenges to the 
epistemic standing of some target beliefs or attitudes. Among theists, Alvin Plantinga, describes 
a “proper” de jure objection as a de jure objection that cannot be shown to implicitly depend on a 
de facto objection. In Warranted Christian Belief, Plantinga argues that there are no de jure 
objections that do not implicitly depend on a de facto objection, that latter being seen as one the 
theist can easily reject. John Bishop and Imran Aijaz (2004) reply that this strong dependence 
Plantinga asserts is too quick, and that the externalist epistemology Plantinga appeals to fails to 
justify the categorical rejection of de jure challenges to Christian belief. More positively, 
however, moderate religious fideism has the resources to “constrain” strong fideism by retaining 
some conditions for proper de jure challenges. Understanding faith as doxastic venture, as did 
Mill and James, is consistent with moderate religious fideism, Bishop and Aijaz argue, but not 
with a view like Plantinga’s where “certain belief” and knowledge are self-attributed by the 
faithful. A doxastic venture account explains how a plurality of religious faith ventures arise, and 
the moral and epistemic limits of our right to them. But “doxastic” venture is used loosely here, 
since the authors do not want to beg the normative question about whether faith is rightly 
understood as a certain kind of propositional attitude. Some of what we call doxastic ventures 
may be sub-doxastic so long as it one’s attitude towards faith-propositions is able to serve its 
normal function in practical reasoning. 46 
While developing a narrowly-targeted de jure objection is the main approach we have 
pursued, CSR has little truck with de jure challenges, since these deal with questions of 
epistemic guidance and of the ethics of belief. CSR can proceed in simple suspension of de facto 
questions about the existence of God. But there is a second kind of de facto challenge on the 
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table that CSR research might support. This is a challenge not to the positive epistemic standing 
of given religious beliefs, nor is it directly a challenge to the existence of God. It is a challenge to 
the correctness of description of religious “avowals” (for example, creedal confessions) as 
“beliefs” in the first place. This sort of ‘debunking’ argument may seem highly revisionary 
because it challenges the self-understanding those engaged in religious discourse, insofar as that 
self-understanding is overtly realist about religious language. Hence this kind of challenge is 
more closely aligned with fictionalist or non-cognitivist views about the aims of religious 
discourse. But for us it suggests further options for how best to understand the relationship 
between de jure and de facto challenges. Let’s call this form of de facto challenge a challenge to 
status as an epistemic state, and we can look at how it draws directly upon work in CSR. But to 
provide background I will first digress onto Wittgenstein’s Lectures on Religious Belief, before 
turning directly to the arguments of Neil van Leeuwen who best presents this type of challenge. 
In the epigraph for this chapter, from Wittgenstein’s Lectures on Religious Belief, we 
read, “No. There it will break down…. No induction” (56). Wittgenstein’s passage I interpret as 
connecting both with a) our methodological approach emphasizing the centrality of counter-
inductive thinking in strongly fideistic conceptions of faith; and b) our analysis of logical and 
moral faults of the exclusivist response to religious multiplicity. The exclusivist is always 
claiming that an inductive pattern, however strong it may be, “breaks down” in their own case, 
usually because of their unique relationship with God. The pattern we apply to all others 
(whether the ‘we’ is a neutral observer or a committed exclusivist), a pattern of producing many 
false beliefs, breaks down in our own case: This is the exclusivist’s purport. The reliability of 
our own tradition is wholly dependent upon its truth, but since exclusivists of every faith claim 
truth for themselves, the pattern-breaking reliability of a single testimonial tradition is still 
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asserted in the face of inductive logic. “No induction. Terror” clearly suggests violation of 
inductive norms. The only way it is not a violation is that the refusal of the demand suggests that 
religious language plays a quite different language game altogether, a game where “truth” loses 
its shared meaning. In the space of epistemically good reasons, the “No induction” demand itself 
demands justification. Not providing a positive response to it is to leave reasonableness, so long 
as reasonableness calls upon rational accountability, or the giving and asking for reasons. 
Wittgenstein’s Lectures on Religious Belief perhaps equivocates between descriptive and 
prescriptive fideism. I take it as primarily descriptive of how faith-based avowals often 
functions. But what has become known as Wittgensteinian fideism is weakly prescriptive as 
well. His claim about the distance between scientific and faith-based practice (which is fitted 
together with his picture theory of meaning) seems to instill an Independence model of the 
relationship between science and religion. Most theologians influenced by the Wittgensteinian 
view are not proponents of a Conflict, but of an Independence model. But let’s back up and 
consider Wittgenstein’s passage more closely on its own terms; although he was not specifically 
concerned with our special focus, his work can still help us illuminate aspects of fideistic 
thinking. Commenting on the contrast of religious and scientific practice, he writes, “A religious 
belief might in fact fly in the face of” a forecast based upon objective reasoning. In the face of an 
objective inductive pattern, Wittgensteinian fideism describes the faith-based believer in the Day 
of Judgment as asserting, “No. There it will break down…. No induction. Fear. That is, as it 
were, part of the substance of the belief.”47 As a historical side-note, Wittgenstein read and 
appreciated Kierkegaard, who held a strong version of prescriptive fideism, claiming that 
genuine faith should not be based upon “objective reasoning.”  
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This is why there is a mismatch but not a contradiction between a) the traits of factual 
belief as we understand it in everyday and scientific thinking, and b) what the religious adherent 
regards as their belief that a prophesied event like the Day of Judgment will indeed occur. 
Wittgenstein is focusing on the (mis)communication between the Day of Judgment believer and 
another person who does not believe it. “These controversies look quite different from any 
normal controversies. Reasons look entirely different from normal reasons.”48 He goes on to 
comment, “In a religious discourse we use such expressions as: ‘I believe that so and so will 
happen,’ and use them differently to the way we use them in science…. [T]here is this 
extraordinary use of the word ‘believe.’ One talks of believing and at the same time one doesn’t 
use ‘believe’ as one does ordinarily.”49 
Together with Wittgenstein’s broader account of disparate language games with little 
commensurability between them, these passages go some distance to explaining Wittgenstein as 
articulating an Independence model of the relationship between scientific and religious thought. 
Vainio and others point out that there has been a “slide to ‘Wittgensteinian fideism’ in narrative 
theology.” But logically, this means more of an Independence model of faith and reason. The 
question becomes whether the insulation of beliefs from evidential challenge which 
Independence affords does not come at the cost of ceding historical claims (“propositions”) to 
evidence-based objective reasoning. This is why charges of relativism regularly attend critical 
examination not only of particularist exclusivism, but also of any conception of religious 
language games that insulate religious assertions from the need for rational justification. 
Following this line of thought there is a kind of cognitive dissonance that we would expect to 
arise for agents in such a situation of prescribed certainty that events, such as miracle events in a 
purported special revelation, in fact transpired. This is because to make an act of faith the basis 
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for certainty about truths of an historical order invites all the oddities that Kierkegaard drew 
attention to, and for which his own response was to abandon objective reasoning in favor of 
embracing the paradoxical idea of “truth as subjectivity.” Evidences are conditional, but truth-
qua-faith is prescribed to be unconditional. Religious truth does not require or even desire 
evidence in the objective sense, but the credence is still a belief with a historical/factual 
content.50  
Since these deep thinkers, Lessing, Kierkegaard, Barth, Wittgenstein and many others all 
point to this cognitive dissonance through metaphors like “ditch,” “chasm,” etc. let’s give a more 
a more definite terminology to this important problem where logic and psychology clash. Let’s 
define State and Standing Tension Effects as follows: 
 
(SAST)   The effects (reported or indicated) of unresolved tension in an agent’s 
thought process brought on by a combination of: 
 a) the underdetermination of historical evidence for a justification of faith, 
and  
b) the overdetermination by multiple trait-dependent factors for taking 
purported special revelation to supply well-grounded 
historical/empirical beliefs.51 
 
 A philosopher who develops this area of concern between psychology and epistemology 
is Neil van Leeuwen. In his papers, “Do Religious ‘Beliefs’ Respond to Evidence?” (2017) and 
“Religious Credence is not Factual Belief” (2014), the author argues that “psychology and 
epistemology should posit distinct cognitive attitudes of religious credence and factual belief, 
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which have different etiologies and different cognitive and behavioral effects.”52 Leeuwen more 
specifically argues that religious credence53 and factual belief have distinctive properties of their 
own: “[F]actual beliefs (i) are practical setting independent, (ii) cognitively govern other 
attitudes, and (iii) are evidentially vulnerable. By way of contrast, religious credences (a) have 
perceived normative orientation, (b) are susceptible to free elaboration, and (c) are vulnerable to 
special authority. Leeuwen’s term “credence” doesn’t require a doxastic interpretation, and it 
captures the mood of faith in following what one takes to be doxastic requirements.54  
I think Leeuwen is correct that “when we talk about differences in ‘beliefs,’ we tend to 
focus on differences in contents, without considering the possibility that we are lumping distinct 
attitudes under this one word.”55 The support he offers for this claim draws upon differences 
between cognitive and conative attitudes, where the former represent how situations are or might 
be, while the latter represent how the agent would like things to be, or how things should be 
made to be. Using this distinction, it becomes problematic to say that things on William James’ 
faith ladder, where there is a shift from what ought to be to what is, rightly constitute “beliefs.” 
James indeed urged us to recognize the mood of faith in our faith ventures. While astute on that 
matter, James never seems to have questioned that these were doxastic ventures; he routinely 
traffics in the language of religious beliefs. Whether it is even possible to intentionally follow 
Kierkegaard’s prescription and acquire a belief one judges not to be sufficiently supported by 
one's evidences, has been recently debated between Andre Buckareff (2005) and John Bishop 
(2005). For our study, the important point is that this problem must lead one to acknowledge 
non-doxastic alternatives to a simple “belief” characterization of faith.56 Looking to actual 
doxastic practice among the religious returns us to SAST effects. The logical tensions between 
fideism and the evidential grounding normally expected of historical beliefs tend to be ignored 
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when the model of faith that is adopted involves any kind of prescribed certitude, or prescribed 
absence of doubt. The prescription makes the will primary in acquiring or maintaining religious 
commitments. Prescribed certainty appears suspiciously oxymoronic. But the logical tensions 
between affective grounds and historical belief cannot be fully repressed. They have 
psychological effects, which Leeuwen supplies empirical evidence of, and which we have 
described as involving observable SAST effects.  
 In this connection, Leeuwen’s analysis might be seen as a different and more subtle form 
of debunking, a de facto form that draws more upon logical and philosophical than evolutionary 
grounds. But as Leeuwen points out, illusory self-attributions of belief, which are certainly 
possible, are harder to investigate when philosophy and cognitive science both tend to assume 
that belief “is a single cognitive attitude type and that variation in behavioral effects of different 
beliefs is due to variation in contents” (706). Leeuwen’s strongest thesis, and one that he 
suggests should guide further psychological and epistemic inquiry, is: 
(RCT)      Religious Credence Thesis: psychology and epistemology should 
posit distinct cognitive attitudes of religious credence and factual 
belief, which have different characteristic etiologies (how they’re 
formed and revised) and different forward effects (downstream 
consequences). 
I am not here endorsing this thesis, which is a broad generalization indeed if intended to 
debunk religious utterances generally. But the basic distinction between belief and credence 
clearly connects with some aspects of our approach through philosophy of luck. It also suggests 
an interesting motivation for a de facto challenge that might either complement or compete with 
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the de jure-focused treatment I gave to the New Problem. What we earlier described as SAST 
effects addresses the same mismatch of belief and evidence. Both Leeuwen’s approach and my 
own have potentially strong implications for religious epistemics. Philosophers of religion have 
often described it by saying the phenomenology is one of “believing in” rather than “believing 
that.” Kierkegaardian truth-as-subjectivity is over-against objective reasoning, but the “gulf” or 
“chasm” thus created cannot simply be denied. Prescribed certainty can engender a kind of 
cognitive dissonance when the prescription to have faith talks to the heart, yet faith is supposed 
held to be held propositionally.57 The resulting mismatch of belief and evidence invites 
confabulation on the part of agents, so that strong fideism is a prime area for study of 
confabulatory explanations. 
The religious normally self-ascribe beliefs to themselves, yet the model of faith at work is 
often one that also identifies genuine faith with heart-felt avowal. This challenges any simple 
assumption that religious avowals are cognitive utterances. Before judging belief-attribution as 
appropriate or somewhat illusory in the religious domain, Leeuwen wants us to note examples of 
conflations in pre-theoretical speech. Historical examples he discusses are “jade” and “hysteria”; 
both terms once lumped together as phenomena that moderns have learned to more carefully 
distinguish. Leeuwen thinks there is an analogy with the catch-all term “belief.” He is at least 
correct that good science depends on recognizing distinct phenomena as distinct, and that we 
need more clarity about “belief” and its close cousins. A related point I would make is that if the 
belief/credence or doxastic/subdoxastic distinction is indeed looming larger today in philosophy 
of religion and in cognitive science of religion, it may be because our descriptive fideism has led 
us to better recognize the way people can conflate these.  
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Another thing my analysis adds to Leeuwen’s is that “prescribed belief” and “prescribed 
certitude,” due to their implicit strong voluntarism, are markers of credence rather than belief.  
The argument here, as in our own de jure approach, has much to do with the strengths of 
analogies, and the conditions for reasonably-drawn disanalogies. Etiological symmetries and 
asymmetries; psychological states of belief and of affective credence; epistemic and pragmatic 
reasons: each of these pairs point to what credences are if they are not beliefs; these pairs do not 
merely point to what kinds of evidence there is for some target religious proposition.58 Motivated 
reasoning — directional thinking — leads to the question of what religious credences are, and 
not just what levels of total evidence there are for different religious propositions.59 Motivated 
reasoning or directional thinking leads to these paradoxes of prescribed certainty. Predictably, 
people try to steer clear of these paradoxes by denying or ‘sinking the fact’ of directional 
thinking in the acquisition and maintenance of their beliefs in the religious domain.60  
No greater moral dissonance is aroused in an individual than by a perceived demand of 
faith that the individual make what Kierkegaard famously termed a “teleological suspension of 
the ethical.” This term is tantamount to Abraham’s perceived duty to follow the will of God for a 
ritual sacrificing of his son Isaac, against all “universal” ethical reasoning. A perceived divine 
command is answered by the knight of faith. The “particular,” suspends and then overrides 
natural sentiments and universal principles; one’s duty is not to think or to question, but to make 
oneself the vessel of God’s will even where its rationality or morality is something of a complete 
mystery. The moral dissonance thus aroused when the perceived demand of God seems at odds 
with universal moral thinking, such as a parent killing their own child, or a loving god 
demanding blood, cannot but affect the individual’s psyche. This is perhaps why Kierkegaard, 
that great lover of paradox, gave us such a rich reflection on Abraham as an exemplar of faith, 
36 
 
and on why says he that he both admired and abhorred his action. But SAST effects and 
Leeuwen’s Religious Credence Thesis focus attention directly not on ethical choices and ensuing 
moral dissonance, but rather on its epistemological correlate, religious avowals on fideistic 
motivations, or what I propose to call “teleological suspension of the logical,” or “teleological 
suspension of the epistemological.” 
In summary, while I remain skeptical of the sweeping, highly revisionary account of 
religious seemings as non-doxastic that Leeuwen’s Religious Credence Thesis introduces, I still 
want to heed his warnings against accepting belief-talk uncritically.61 Faith venture should be 
understood as potentially referring to doxastic or to sub-doxastic commitments. Leeuwen’s thesis 
and the empirical support that he offers for it substantially broadens our understanding of de 
facto challenges and their relationship to our more restricted de jure argument focused just 
around exclusivist responses to religious multiplicity. While it might seem natural to associate 
(RCT) with a sweeping de facto argument, in fact Leeuwen’s account throws a strong light on 
what he terms “extremist credence.” Extremist credences “are vicious because they are not 
responsive to evidence and they have unrestricted downstream consequences on thought and 
action.”62 
 It is these that display the strong mismatch we find in SAST effects. Leeuwen defines 
extremist credences as ones that are allowed to be “behavior-guiding,” and to have “wide 
cognitive governance,” yet without acknowledging evidential vulnerability: “As the practical 
setting of religious credence expands to cover more and more of an agent’s life, without also 
acquiring evidential vulnerability, the agent tends toward extremism, which is vicious.”63 This 
passage I think locates one target of Leeuwen’s argument, similar to our own, as strong fideism 
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and the teleological suspensions of the ethical, logical, and epistemological that it regularly 
generates. 
 
Counter-Inductive Thinking and Minimally Counter-Intuitive Teachings: How Related? 
 
As we noted earlier, comparative fundamentalism and CSR have not been closely connected, 
and CSR is sometimes criticized for neglecting the particularities of practices and beliefs that 
interest those in religious studies. It is of course such particularities that claims to religious 
uniqueness are premised upon. Robert McCauley’s response to the question of balance raised 
earlier is that CSR’s focus on popular religiosity and the appeal of maturationally natural ideas is 
well-suited “to redress an imbalance in religious studies – an imbalance in favour of the 
particular over the general and the interpretive over the explanatory.”64  
McCauley and other cognitivists take popular representations of the supernatural to be 
culturally successful because they trigger and are processed by intuitive systems. By their focus 
on what I call the etiologically deep, they tend to ignore directional thinking. McCauley shares 
James’ claim that theological systems are secondary constructions, but he is quite critical of what 
he perceives as James’ over-emphasis on faith tendencies as emotionally engaged. Also, James 
focused on experience, mostly of the exceptionally faithful, while McCauley focuses on 
evolutionary mechanisms and their manifestation in popular religiosity. While CSR’s focus is 
certainly valid, I worry that the cognitivist approach tends to jettison Mill’s and James’ interests 
in individual temperament and the role of emotions and value religious faith ventures. James is 
certainly correct that there is constant movement between belief and value during assent up the 
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“faith ladder.” Also, the role of directional thinking in generating religious contrariety is central 
to our earlier critique of fundamentalism, and to any de jure or responsibility-focused approach 
such as we have taken in this book. 
But there may be grounds for rapprochement between the more cognitivist and 
comparative approaches in the study of religion. There may be specific research projects that call 
upon both, and require their broader integration. This is what I think we discover when we pose a 
question about the relationship between McCauley’s interest in the universal appeal of 
“minimally counter-intuitive” ideas, and our own interest in people’s differential predilection to 
indulge in “counter-inductive” thinking. Let’s explore this relationship more methodically. CSR 
tells us that there is a correlation between “minimally counter-intuitive” ideas arising from 
maturationally natural processes, and the beliefs/credences that people find the most memorable, 
‘live,’ or appealing.65 Does this attractiveness of ideas that are ‘just weird enough’ suggest that 
there could be a more direct relationship also between Type 1 or maturationally natural 
processing and counter-inductive thinking? In other words, does the attractiveness of counter-
intuitive or counter-schematic religious ideas for some agents predict a pattern of counter-
inductive inference in the religious domain? I believe so, and will here argue that this connection 
between CSR’s focus on counter-intuitive content with our own focus on violation of inductive 
norms in one’s mode of inference and explanation has the potential to expand CSR’s focus by 
connecting it in various ways with religion and philosophy of luck/risk as articulated in Part I.  
A propensity for counter-inductive thinking may be only one instance of 
negative attitudes towards reason carried in one’s model of faith. Emil Brunner, an 
influential Lutheran post-liberal, for example claims that “the teaching of the gospel and 
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the theory of progress are irreconcilable opposites.”66 This is a conflict model of the 
relationship between faith and reason. It may relatedly be suggested that a combination 
of CSR’s religious idea-focused approach and our own explanation-focused approach 
both diagnose ‘ironic’ rationalizations of religious exceptionalism. The example we 
have used is Barth’s irony that God faults all religion, yet chooses Christianity to be the 
root of revelation, and Christians alone to rightly award themselves ‘the prize.’ But this 
extends more generally to scriptural passages where God’s irony shows through a) in 
disdaining the evidence-demanding ‘doubting Thomas’; b) in choosing to convey 
highest wisdom or revelation through those who seem weakest; or c) in choosing a 
divine plan where the meek shall eventually inherit the earth; or d) in purposefully 
making true saving revelation appear as “foolishness to the Greeks,” etc.67 Are highly 
ironic religious narratives such as these perhaps more credible to individuals whose 
model of faith is more than just moderately fideistic? If so, is this perhaps because these 
ironies, connected with minimally counterintuitive ideas on the one hand and discovery 
of truth through counter-inductive inference on the other, coheres with their own 
strongly anti-rationalist theological method?  
CSR is seeing innovations that allow investigators better access to people’s actual and/or 
implicit religious beliefs and attitudes. For example, interest has been drawn to covert and 
implicit measures of religiosity, in addition to explicit measures like self-reports; source 
monitoring tasks; partially structured measures using responses to short narratives, consistency 
between explicitly and implicitly-held religious beliefs; and theological correctness or distance 
between theologically correct belief and popular religiosity. 
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Attempting to find measures for “religiosity” in some general sense is not as useful for 
connecting CSR with philosophy of religion, as are more specific measures for counter-inductive 
thinking and what I term bias-mirroring. From a descriptive or scientific perspective, the etiology 
of belief in religious faith traditions is symmetrical until proven otherwise. But asymmetric trait-
ascriptions can be studied simply as bias-like, since methodological neutrality limits do not 
license psychologists to ‘reduce’ ironic narratives to tropes, or theologically-case asymmetric 
religious trait-ascriptions to known social bias. But it does license them to study how people’s 
self-reported responses to religious multiplicity mirror known cognitive and social biases. Let’s 
call this a bias mirroring effect (BME). As the New Problem in chapter Two, and the articulation 
we gave to descriptive fideism in chapters Three and Four worked to show, strong fideists to a 
significant extent mirror one another in their mode of belief acquisition, and in the ways that they 
maintain their uniqueness and superiority. Some of the best evidence for the mirroring of social 
biases among test subjects might be the extent to which they attribute bias to religious aliens in 
order to buttress their uniqueness and to explain the falsity of contrary beliefs and the culpability 
of others in holding them. Bias mirroring effects are in evidence wherever we find test subjects 
responding in ways that a biased individual would think or judge.  
It has been proposed that CSR’s studies of minimally counter-intuitive ideas and their 
psychological appeal can be approached philosophically from its connection with epistemic risk 
and with how religious agents weigh or fail to weigh it. If there is such a connection between 
counter-intuitive content of appealing ideas and counter-inductive thinking as a matter of 
strength of fideistic orientation, then religious epistemics must study the implications of these 
and other empirical studies. This also reinforces the point that in CSR there is no either/or choice 
between an explanatory approach focused on general cognitive mechanisms and an approach 
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through comparative study of fideistic orientation. Cognitivists remain interested in studying the 
“doctrinal mode of religiosity,” and my suggestions for more integration between CSR and 
religious studies are made in the spirit of Jesper Sorensen’s claim that cognitivist theories enable 
“more precise historical (and ethnographic) descriptions as well as facilitate comparative 
historiography.”68 
The best way to look for these connections between the counter-intuitive and the counter-
inductive is to utilize our inductive risk toolkit to pose some new questions at this intersection. 
Table 4.2 codifies a number of these suggestions including how best to scale fideistic orientation 
along a spectrum from weaker to stronger. Philosophers might interact with cognitive 
psychologists in designing related tasks, and honing the hypotheses that motivate them. The two 
kinds of tasks outlined on this table —Inductive Risk and Source Monitoring— are easy-enough 
to define. Inductive Risk tasks are tasks with making inferences from inductive evidence. Source 
monitoring tasks ask test subjects to interpret the meaning of provided testimony, to assess the 
trustworthiness of a testimonial source, and to distinguish empirical from narrative meaning. The 
two kinds of effects outlined on the table —Bias Mirroring and SAST— are ones that I suggest 
can best be studied in self-reporting surveys about their own doxastic methods, after they have 
been primed in ways that make them sensitive to these problems in other people’s (for instance, 
religious outsiders’) doxastic methods.69 Some of the other questions on the chart highlight how 
philosophers best interact for the sake of this research program with social psychologists 
concerned with religious radicalization, or with comparative religious studies scholars. 
My proposal for balancing the general and the particular in the scientific study of religion 
is also in a sense a proposal for bringing philosophy and psychology of religion closer together. 
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While trying to develop specific scales for the just-described observable effects would be a 
collaborative project that goes well beyond the scope of this book, McCauley and other CSR 
researchers often call for new questions at the interfaces of philosophy and psychology. Table 
4.2, with which we can draw this chapter to a close, aims to provide some slightly more formal 
questions reflecting our approach. Since we primarily motivate it as an investigation of possible 
correlations between the Appeal of Counter-Intuitive Ideas and the Penchant for Counter-
Inductive Thinking, I will give this research program the simple acronym, CICI. 
<table 4.2 near here> 
Inductive Risk Tasks 
a) Tasks on fluid rationality 
and critical reasoning 
dispositions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b) Rationalism-Fideism Scale 
 
Tasks with inductive evidence and inference70 
What are the studyable relationships between the natural 
asymmetry of causal explanation and the way that asymmetries are 
ascribed and causal inferences made by people in the religious 
domain? 
Does the attractiveness of counter-intuitive or counter-schematic 
ideas or evidence for some agents predict a pattern counter-
inductive inference in the religious domain? 
Does strongly fideistic orientation correlate with heightened 
counter-intuitive, counter-schematic, counter-inductive, and 
counter-evidential thinking?71 
 
What is each tested person’s orientation on a rationalistic-to-
fideistic spectrum? How can their specific theological method be 
described?  
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c) Fundamentalist Orientation 
Scales 
 
 
 
How might strong fideistic orientation be measured with markers 
of the person’s inductively risky beliefs or doxastic strategies? 
Is cognitive risk-taking prescribed by the agent’s theological 
method? Is the need for objective evidence of one’s religious 
beliefs accepted or rejected? 
How can religious orientation scales be made more comparative? 
How can psychologists study similarities among Abrahamic 
religions? What are the markers of fideistic testimonial authority 
assumption? 
In what domains or with what priming does inductive norm 
violation most often occur? How do counter-inductive inferences 
protect assumptions of religious uniqueness and superiority? 
 
Source Monitoring Tasks 
 
a) Assessment of claims & 
sources of claims 
 
 
 
b) Assessment of narrative vs. 
simple testimonial intent 
 
Tasks of interpreting the meaning of provided testimonial or 
other sources of claims 
How do religious and non-religious subjects differ in how reliably 
they are able to monitor claims and sources of claims? 
Do religious subjects differ from others in how reliably they track 
inner vs. outer sources of experience?  
How trait-dependent are these and other inferences people make 
from their purported religious experiences? 
How reliably do they track differences between simple and 
narrative testimony? For example, how reliably do they track 
imaginary elements, and author intent?  
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c) Assessment of authority of 
the written word, or expertise 
in different domains 
How reliably do they recognize non-literal passages within longer 
testimonial tracks?  
Are people more likely to attribute reliability and inerrancy to a 
written text, in contrast with non-written forms of testimony? 
How do assumptions about religious authority or expertise bear 
upon what religious ideas are treated as inerrant?  
Do people attribute expertise uncritically or in minimally truth-apt 
domains where expertise is doubtful? 
Are ambiguous/mysterious/ironic religious texts/teachings 
preferred and found persuasive (the Guru effect)?  
 
Bias Mirroring Effects 
 
a) Ethnocentrism  
 
b) Group biases 
 
c) Inter-personal biases 
 
 
Indicators of religious subjects mirroring what they concede 
biased persons would say or do. 
Do religious and non-religious subjects differ in likelihood of 
absolutizing ethics, or culture-specific mores? In advocating 
express moral paternalism? 
Do religious and non-religious subjects differ in mirroring 
epistemic or ontic injustice toward outgroupers? 
How do religious and non-religious subjects differ in how they 
mirror group biases (for instance, ingroup-outgroup bias, group 
polarization)? 
Is there more willingness among religious persons to risk others by 
submitting them to the ingroup’s moral dictates? How is the 
exposure of others to moral risk rationalized? 
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How do religious and non-religious subjects differ in how they 
mirror personal biases (for instance, my-side bias, belief bias, 
assimilation bias, false consensus, pluralistic ignorance)? 
Does the religious subject’s response to religious multiplicity rely 
on peerhood denial through theologically-cast discrediting 
mechanisms? 
Does the religious subject’s response to religious multiplicity rely 
on ‘easy closure’ inferences to support the falsity of all beliefs 
inconsistent with the home religion, or to support the reduction of 
complex multiplicity to simple contradiction and truth versus 
falsity? 
Does the religious subject mirror belief-bias and my-side bias more 
so than non-religious subjects? Is this mirroring more pronounced 
as the subjects studied move up the scale of fideistic orientation?  
 
SAST (Epistemic State and 
Standing Tension) Effects 
 
a) Pressure on epistemic 
standing of beliefs/judgments 
 
 
 
Indicators of religious subjects having unresolved mismatches, 
for example, mismatches between explicit and implicit, or 
between religious credences and evidence/belief, etc. 
When a task shows the religious subject that a (or preferably her 
own) doxastic strategy is epistemically risky, does she display 
expected contingency anxiety? Does she show marks of tension 
between asserting a religious absolutism and the cultural 
contingencies of religious identity? 
If so, how does this come with willingness for belief revision? If 
not, is the absence of contingency anxiety associated with marks of 
cognitive dissonance? Of confabulatory explanation? 
46 
 
 
 
 
b) Slippage between models, 
and logical coherence faults 
 
 
Are there indicators of religious subjects’ cognitive attitudes as 
fitting profiles of alief rather than belief, conative rather than 
cognitive attitudes, etc.? 
Is there observable ‘slippage’ in the subject’s responses between 
emotional/affective responses and assertion of cognitive truth 
claims?  
Is there observable ‘slippage’ between the agent’s espousal of an 
Independence model and a Conflict (or Warfare) model of the 
relationship between reason and faith?  
Does priming the subject for SAST effects increase her willingness 
to compensate with a higher reliance on a Conflict (Warfare) 
model of the relationship between faith and reason? 
Under what priming or assigned tasks do we observe religious 
subjects violate inductive norms, or express a willingness for 
teleological suspension of the logical, or the epistemological? 
Table 4.2  CICI: Some Key Questions for Research on Relationships between the Appeal of 
Counter-Intuitive Ideas and the Penchant for Counter-Inductive thinking  
 
Part Two Conclusion 
Part II of this book developed implications and applications of Part I’s focus on problems 
of religious luck/risk. It did so by recasting many of the problems regarding luck-leaning 
asymmetric religious-trait ascriptions into more formal terms of assumed moral and epistemic 
risk. Inductive risk emerged as a central concept in this study, and as a concept that helps 
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operationalize problems of lucky belief, luckily true belief, and moral risk attending doxastic 
faith ventures. We gave fullest development to why there may be strong correlations between 
inductively risky cognitive strategies and religious fideism, what implications such correlations 
might have, and what sorts of reasoning tasks and self-reporting questions might be assigned to 
subjects of psychological experiments to test for these correlations and others involving specific 
religious orientation and disposition to violate inductive norms. 
Chapter 3 more specifically elaborated how religious contrariety arises on the basis of 
etiological symmetries. It examined the enemy in the mirror phenomenon where multiple groups, 
while arising on a similar basis at least in terms of proximate causes, come to similarly 
absolutistic stances where unfriendliness towards religious outsiders is typical, and may even be 
taken as theological correctness. Uniqueness of content or standing with the divine is 
emphasized, and etiological symmetry and its epistemological implication is ignored. The 
emergence of the enemy in the mirror can be predicted to arise in testimonial traditions which 
promote strongly fideistic models of faith. A research program to examine fideistic orientation 
and its relation to epistemically risky doxastic strategies is one of potentially numerous research 
programs on which philosophers and psychologists might work collaboratively. 
Chapter 4 took up the matter of the limits of reasonable disagreement more directly, 
examining critiquing both forms that salvific exclusivism can take, particularist exclusivism and 
mutualist exclusivism. Since mutualist exclusivism aims to get around power objections to the 
reasonableness of particularist or religion-specific exclusivism, that chapter developed a 
dilemma and other direct arguments to challenge it.  
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Chapter 5 presented a critical examination of the logical coherence of the two forms of 
religious exclusivism, religion-specific, and mutualist. Picking up where the Exceptionalist 
Dilemma of the New Problem in Chapter 2 left off, but utilizing more of the Inductive Risk 
‘Toolkit’ developed in the intermediate chapters, I explained why post-liberal theologians have 
turned towards mutualist exclusivism when they try to defend the rationality or reasonableness of 
the two things that have been the focus of this book: exclusivist responses to religious 
multiplicity, and radically asymmetric religious trait-ascriptions. But I also argued that mutualist 
exclusivism on closer examination implies its own contradiction, and so is conceptually 
incoherent. I also argued that in its practical consequences it tends to produce the enemy in the 
mirror, and to mirror all manner on known biases by rejecting genuine inter-faith dialogue in 
favour of polarized and polemical apologetics. So not just the logical coherence, but the moral 
and theological adequacy of mutualist exclusivism were also directly challenged.  
Chapter 6 then examined themes in CSR, and suggested a substantial fusion of concerns 
with counter-intuitive ideas (an assessment of content) and counter-intuitive thinking (an 
assessment of patterns of inference). We asked whether McCauley’s study of the appeal of 
maturationally natural ideas, including those that have some degree of counter-intuitiveness, can 
be connected with observable counter-inductive propensities in their patterns of inference. I 
argued that philosophy of luck/risk allows us to investigate the many connections between strong 
or counter-inductive fideism and the counter-intuitive ideas of popular religiosity. I have argued 
that a proper de jure objection to the well-foundedness of belief and to the doxastic responsibility 
of the agent can at the least be made when the target of the de jure challenge is specific beliefs, 
attitudes, or doxastic strategies. Since our account is agent focused and, as pragmatist, holds an 
understanding of epistemology as a theory of inquiry and agency, we did not target theism 
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generally. Theism, deism, pantheism, and many other conceptions of godhead may be associated 
with texts considered scriptural, but we have explored how especially important the concept of 
special revelation is in the testimonial traditions, especially those of the Abrahamic family of 
religions. And we argued that the testimonial authority assumption is key indicator of fideism, 
and takes many different, culturally specific forms, but is only one of multiple markers of 
fideistic orientation.  Such a restricted target as my own does not presuppose the truth or falsity 
of theism, and is methodologically agnostic about putative special revelations. If it is judged by 
the reader that my approach goes beyond neutrality to overt scepticism about purported special 
revelation, then the reader will associate it with the many European and American 
Enlightenment-era philosophes who were, This need and should not depend on the falsity of 
something so broad as what James calls “the religious hypothesis,” though the relationship 
between de facto and de jure objections is an interesting and timely project that, Leeuwen’s 
credence theory, philosophers of religion, CSR researches and theologians concerned with luck-
free theologies should all pursue. I introduced my own collaborative research program, CICI that 
a) gives reason to think there are important hypotheses to be pursued at the intersection of CSR 
research on the popular appeal of counter-intuitive ideas, and research focused on counter-
inductive thinking, as our inductive risk theory proposes.  McCauley is always inviting new 
questions to spur further developments in CSR, and in answer to this we concluded with a list of 
more specific questions that allow us, a) to give more detail to the proposal for a new scale for 
religious orientation that focuses on characteristics of counter-inductive thinking as a key 
indicator of strongly fideistic orientation; b) to more specifically connect CSR with philosophy 
of luck, with problems of religious luck, and with the hypothesis of descriptive fideism; c) to 
develop all of these as a contribution to the advancement of the field of comparative 
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fundamentalism; and d) to balance in the proposed research program the powerful generalism of 
the cognitive approach with the careful attention to trait-dependent individual and group 
differences, including differences in doxastic methods, that is so important in philosophy and 
social science as well as in theology. 
 
Book Conclusion 
The explanatory relevance of measures of inductive risk connects it with cognitive and social 
psychology of religion, while its normative relevance connects with epistemology of testimony, 
the epistemic significance of disagreement, and the ethics of belief. The chapters of Part II have 
developed both sides of our inductive risk account, while trying to keep them properly separated.  
On the normative side, the major theme of the book has been the limits of reasonable 
disagreement, and how these limits are surpassed in responses to disagreement or to religious 
diversity where one or more of the disputants relies explicitly or implicitly on counter-inductive 
thinking to judge matters of religious truth. We have argued for the intellectual and moral 
inadequacy of the exclusivist response to religious multiplicity, and insisted that at the least, faith 
and other theological virtues need to be rendered consistent with universal moral and epistemic 
virtues. We have emphasized that given the plurality of models of faith that the religious employ, 
a person’s inherited model of faith should be the first, and not the last thing given critical 
attention by responsible believers. We therefore more constructively discussed moral and 
epistemic virtue, and how appealing to virtue-based conceptions of moral and doxastic 
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responsibility suggests a good deal of common ground between religionists and secularists, and a 
basis for dialogue.  
Problems of religious luck can be debated in a lot of different ways, and I have tried to 
advance this debate rather than arguing that it must play out in one specific way in philosophy of 
religion. So we have tried to stay neutral with respect to certain debates about religious realism, 
so as to produce a proper de jure arguments against exclusivist attitudes to religious multiplicity, 
and theologically-cast, radically asymmetric trait-ascriptions to religions insiders and outsiders. I 
have not assumed that belief may never be permissibly responsive to non-epistemic reasons, and 
I reject one-size-fits-all answers to the question of how a person should reasonably respond to 
genuine peer disagreement. Since our focus has been on the limits of reasonable disagreement, 
we have not said much positively in support of a permissivist ethics of belief, although we have 
situated our account in close proximity to pragmatism and to Rawlsian reasonable pluralism.  
Hence it is enough to say that the inductive risk account might be consistent with 
different accounts of the ethics of belief, and of proper philosophical guidance, but that my 
pragmatism leads me to view as permissible all such religious faith ventures as do not centrally 
ply on good/bad religious luck (or “aggravate” problems of religious luck, to go back to 
Zagzebski’s original paper). I have on these issues basically taken a Rawlsian, broadly 
permissivist view, while developing with Bishop and Aijaz the important idea that recognition of 
a right to moderately fideistic assumptions is the most philosophically sound and practically 
effective way to constrain strongly fideistic faith ventures. In this way also, the book does not 
just explain how to present a proper de jure objection; it also suggests how to answer such an 
objection when its target is sweepingly broad (for instance, alleging the irrationality of all 
theistic belief), or when the objection is only belief and not agent-focused. 
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I had earlier thought to conclude this book with reference to William James’ famous 1896 
Preface to The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy, where he writes, 
[I]f we are empiricists, if we believe that no bell in us tolls to let us know for 
certain when truth is in our grasp, then it seems a piece of idle fantasticality to 
preach so solemnly our duty of waiting for the bell. Indeed we may wait if we 
will, —I hope you do not think that I am denying that— but… in either case 
we act, taking our life in our hands. No one of us ought to issue vetoes to the 
other, nor should we bandy words of abuse. We ought, on the contrary, delicately 
and profoundly to respect one another's mental freedom: then only shall we bring 
about the intellectual republic….72 
 
The Preface ends with James’ prescription that we “live and let live” in spiritual or 
secular experiments of living, tolerating them so long as they are tolerant themselves. A self-
consistent permissivism allows that there is no duty to tolerate the intolerant; the logical 
coherence of pluralism is clearly decreased, not increased, by the notion of toleration of anti-
pluralism without limit. But there is keen recognition in James’ view that religious and 
philosophical overbeliefs serve positive functions personally and socially, and that in them “the 
negative, the alogical, is never wholly banished.” Thus I agree strongly with James’ permissivist 
recommendation to value and support that “spirit of inner tolerance without which all our 
outer tolerance is soulless, and which is empiricism's glory.”73 But I will make one qualification 
of James’ claim, to conclude instead that rational support for a spirit of inner tolerance is 
empiricism’s conclusion, and God’s glory. 
End 
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Chapter Six Notes 
1  Wittgenstein, “Lectures on Religious Belief.”  
 
2 Philosophers since Thales and Xenophanes since ancient times have offered insight into 
religious psychology, sometimes contrasting the poets and priests who employed mythoi to 
explain events, and natural philosophers who by employing logoi gave impetus to Greek science. 
Some of the ancients, like Hippocrates, the father of medicine, criticized the philosophers along 
with the poets and priests, contrasting all of them with his more empirical approach to the causes 
and treatment of disease. But the turn from myth and supernaturalism at the dawn of philosophy 
in the Greek tradition needn’t be thought of as pitting science and faith, Enlightenment-mode 
thinking versus irrationalism. CSR seemingly draws as easily from counter-Enlightenment 
thinkers like Montaigne, Pascal, James, as it does from Enlightenment mode thinkers like 
Lessing, Locke, Hume, Kant, and Voltaire. 
 
3 Adam Green (2013, 417) for example writes that, “the cognitive science of religion can actually 
be used as a tool when doing theology from within the perspective of a faith tradition. It can, in 
effect, help to clarify religious doctrine from the inside.” 
 
4 D. Xygalatas and R. McKay, “Announcing the Journal for the Cognitive Science of Religion,” 
1. 
 
5 Hume, Natural History of Religion, Introduction. Compare what James calls the “intellectual 
operations” related to religion (Varieties, 433) include primarily those that of our overbeliefs, 
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those of philosophy, and those of a science of religion. Graham Wood (2011, 734) notes, “as 
Hume’s famous distinction makes clear, there is an important difference between the reasons for 
religious belief and the causes of religious belief.” 
 
6 We will engage them more later, but they are strictly speaking limit questions for science, if we 
are not to conflate science and values, description and naturalistic explanation with endorsement 
of a strongly naturalistic metaphysics. The explanatory scope of CSR falls well short of deciding 
such things as the reality of miracles. Theistic and atheistic worldviews, and spiritualist and 
materialist metaphysics are in the domain of controversial views, whereas science and religious 
studies are methodologically “agnostic” or neutral on questions of religious metaphysics. They 
may still be a source of well-grounded empirical premises that might be used in arguments that 
aim to establish a metaphysical conclusion. This may be a simplistic answer, but for our study 
we will hold tightly to the neutrality of CSR to questions metaphysical. 
 
7 To reiterate, de facto objections state that purported force f likely does not exist, or that the 
claim that p is likely false rather than true. De jure objections state that force x is explanatorily 
spurious or superfluous, or that the claim that p, whether true or not, is rationally or morally 
deficient. The epistemological use is typically that the claim that p lacks positive epistemic 
standing, on account of its being epistemologically unjustified/unsafe/insensitive, etc. This 
mildly generalizes Plantinga’s description. Focusing only on “Christian belief” he writes, “De 
facto objections are relatively straightforward and initially uncomplicated: the claim is that 
Christian belief must be false (or at any rate improbable), given something or other we are all 
alleged to know. De jure objections, by contrast… are much less straightforward. The conclusion 
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of [a de jure] objection will be that there is something wrong with Christian belief – something 
other than falsehood – or else something wrong with the Christian believer: it or she is 
unjustified, or irrational, or rationally unacceptable, in some way” (Warranted Christian Belief, 
ix). I am treating de jure challenge, and the concept of reasonableness more generally, as 
something that can be framed so in terms open to any or all of the  three kinds of “adequacy” 
objections: epistemological, ethical, and theological. The overlap in these approaches strengthens 
is appropriate to the dialectical setting where disputants may not have a lot of common ground; 
they need multiple modes of criteria in order to assess the normative force of a de jure challenge, 
and the three-pronged approach supplies this.  
 
8 Philosophers, theologians, and others can talk about CSR as having implications that support or 
undermine the rationality of belief, or support or undermine the truth aptness of theistic beliefs, 
but these issues are not scientific. Truth aptness is closely connected with sensitivity, since the 
sensitivity principle imposes a modal constraint on true belief: if the proposition believed were 
false, one would not believe it. Sensitivity, for those who would defend it as a condition on 
justification or knowledge, requires is that one would not believe P by the same method were P 
false. 
 
9 Theologians often posit final in addition to efficient causes, or they take natural laws 
discoverable scientifically as “secondary” causes, with “primary” causes standing beyond or 
before them. To the extent that the “final” or “primary” causes are understood to be consistent 
with natural law (as contrasted, say, with the view that God controls all things directly), these 
faith-based tenets are part of an Independence rather than a Conflict model of the relationship 
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between religion and science. Their problem is not direct tension with discoverable facts, but 
mainly their apparent unfalsifiability and superfluous nature from the scientific point of view.  
These concerns are taken here as ones for philosophers and theologians; while they are material 
in understanding de jure and de facto challenges, CSR as an empirically-oriented science can 
proceed neutrally to them. For better or worse, religious studies scholars usually refer to this as 
methodological agnosticism. 
 
10 McCauley 2010, 779.   
 
11 The debate is more broadly recognizable even in the contrasting focus on “religion” (CSR 
favors the singular term) versus “religions” (for instance the hermeneutic study that calls itself 
“theology of religions”). 
 
12 Tremlin, Minds and Gods, (2010, 9.) 
 
13 This suggests to me that religious exclusivism may be a special expression of other, well-
recognized sorts of us – of them separations, in that despite the unique content of the beliefs, 
they are produced by many of the same processes. What is different is the metaphysical 
explanation, but ideas are maintained and passed on which have social evolutionary advantages 
that others do not. 
 
14  Jack Lyons and Barry Ward, The New Critical Thinking, Introduction. As articulated earlier 
by Paul Thagard, “Attempts to improve inferential practice need to consider psychological error 
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tendencies, which are patterns of thinking that are natural for people but frequently lead to 
mistakes in judgment.” Philosophical rationalism tends to lead philosophers to conflate thinking 
and reasoning, but, for instance, “It would be highly misleading to depict motivated inference as 
a sort of fallacious argument akin to wishful thinking, of the form: I want X, therefore X is 
true….Motivated inference is more complex than wishful thinking because it involves selective 
recruitment and assessment of evidence based on unconscious processes that are driven by 
emotional considerations of goals rather than purely cognitive reasoning” (2011, 156). 
 
15 Vainio 2017, 94. 
 
16 Vainio, 112. 
 
17 Vainio anticipates a potentially strong de facto objection even against theological adequacy of 
such a view, since by the theist’s own account of divine attributes, God should not be a deceiver. 
Theologically, a method of belief formation that resulted in a great deal of false positives would 
be, at the least, inefficient. Morally, it raises all kinds of problems like those of non-culpable 
nonbelievers, and intellectually, it puts human beings in a terrible epistemic position. This is why 
Visala and Leech describe such a scenario as a deceiving god scenario, and why they develop a 
deceiving god argument (Deus deceptor), in that “it seems that God is responsible for creating a 
set of cognitive processes that, for the most part, prevent real knowledge of spiritual reality, 
while allowing multiple false conceptions to develop freely” (2011, 95). Religious rationalists 
like Descartes would be rolling over in their graves at the reliance on an assumption that God is a 
deceiver. There are some theological responses intended to support exclusivism. Vainio thinks 
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that from a Molinist perspective, one can consistently claim that because God has middle 
knowledge, he can set apart those who would not believe in any possible world. “These 
individuals (i.e., those who are not elected) are then located in a time and place for Christian 
faith are nonexistent or rare.” Also possible he thinks is a sterner Calvinist response: “God 
wishes to save only those whom he has elected from massa perditionis.” On both scenarios, the 
saved must be few, and those justly condemned outnumber them massively. Limited atonement 
is very controversial, both morally and as a biblical interpretation. It is biblical enough if one is 
literalist about Revelations 7, which says the 144,000 are to be saved, which, if one does the 
math against the 7 billion estimate of humans that have ever lived, comes out to  (144000/ 
7000000000) x 100 = 0.002%. For literalists, then, 99.998% of the population goes to hell. More 
importantly, in his subsequent treatment of NERBs, Vainio conflates the distinction between de 
facto and de jure objections, a distinction we have made efforts to carefully delineate. It is not 
my point to go back to moral and theological critique, but my earlier thesis stands that it is a 
radically fideistic account that separates theological qua biblical adequacy from moral and 
epistemological concern, as both of these response to the Deus deceptor argument appear to do. 
 
18 Barrett’s account suggests that religious traditions are more or less coincidental conglomerates 
of cognitively optimal concepts, possibly epiphenomena without causal effect. “[P]psychologist 
Justin Barrett has demonstrated that, when performing under pressure, people tend to make 
inferences that are often in sharp contrast to their explicitly held theological convictions, and 
instead fall back on intuitive ideas. This distinction between explicitly held theological ideas and 
implicit theological incorrectness highlights the question whether we can understand behaviour 
by reference to the teachings of religious systems” (J. Sorensen, 2005, 476).  
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19 Vainio, 83. Vainio utilizes studies in cognitive science of religion, but also criticizes the 
reductive spirit of many of its practitioners, or at least of the non-scientists who try to use it as 
grounds for religious skepticism. He complains, for example, that “the cognitive science of 
religion has concentrated almost solely on religion as a product of type I cognition. This tends to 
distort the religious reality the theories are trying to depict and explain. It is not clearly the case 
that religious believers are not engaging in higher and refine forms of cognition, or that 
theologians ideas are systematically disregarded… The image that a casual reader gets is that 
type II cognition (theology and philosophy) are post hoc rationalizations of fundamentally 
irrational for beliefs. However, if we investigate, we see immediately how odd and ad hoc this 
claim is. The same dialectic also pertains to scientific theories and philosophical arguments as 
they supervene on folk beliefs and try to control and refine them” (83). 
 
20 However, Vainio seems to miss that unlike the ideal of psychology that reductive 
eliminativism upholds, many theorists in CSR today like Jong and McCauley are explanatory 
pluralists, holding that “theories at different levels can co-evolve and mutually influence each 
other, without reduction of the higher-level theory to the lower-level one.” Schouten and de Jong 
(2012), Introduction. 
 
21 Cleveland’s Disunity in Christi is far less concerned than Vainio with the implications of these 
psychological studies for religious epistemics, but in more practically concerned with their 
implications for the prospects of Christian unity. For example she discusses the implications of 
the study of group polarization for religious philosophy. Studies suggest that people reason 
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better in groups when there is diversity of opinion, and willingness to voice dissent and the 
reasons for it. On the other hand, “In the absence of diverse influences, homogenous groups tend 
to adopt more extreme and narrow-minded thinking as time passes.” This is so even though, as 
Cleveland notes, churchgoers today to an unprecedented degree tend to ‘shop’ for the church and 
community that express their values. Indeed, those who “exit adolescence without interacting 
across cultural lines can easily evolve into churchgoers who continue to maintain these divisions 
in culturally homogenous churches. Ultimately, homogeneity within churches lives on while 
meaningful cross-cultural and cross-ideological interactions are limited” (Cleveland 2013, 26-
27). 
 
22 See my “Thinking Twice about Virtue and Vice” (2017c). I there argue that  credit theories 
can treat many cases of cognitive success through heuristic cognitive strategies as credit-
conferring, It depends on whether the heuristic strategy of inquiry (described at the right level of 
generality to address the “Generality Problem”) is reliable in that type of epistemic 
situation/domain. This all bears on the philosophical implications of dual process theory, arguing 
that the ecological nature of human cognition has strong normative implications for 
epistemology, including virtue epistemology. A genuine convergence between virtue 
epistemology and dual-process theory is called for, while acknowledging that this effort may 
demand new and more empirically well-informed projects on both sides of the division between 
Conservative virtue epistemology (including the credit theory of knowing) and Autonomous 
virtue epistemology (including projects for providing guidance to epistemic agents). See also 
Church and Samuelson (2014) for a similar attempt to reconcile virtue theory and dual-process 
theory/ecological rationality. Our papers both respond directly to the situationist challenge to 
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virtue epistemology, and I also respond there to the “Trade-off Dilemma” of John Doris, and 
Lauren Olin and their “vicious minds” hypothesis.  See Keith Stanovich (2011), West, Toplak 
and Stanovich (2008) for an introduction to dual-process theory, and philosophers such as Nancy 
Snow (2006; 2009) and Holly Smith (2015), Table 1 reflects further ideas about philosophy and 
current cognitive science. 
 
23 Vainio (2017), 98. 
 
24 Vainio (2017), 99. 
 
25 Vainio (2017), 99. 
 
26 Barrett (2011, 150-51), quoted by Vainio (2017, 98).  
 
27 Mahmut Aydin (2004) emphasizes this about the Abrahamic religions in particular, that the 
main cause of enmities, conflict and hatred “is to be found in the way believers so exaggerate 
their differences that they forget their common core” (235). He reminds us that taking other 
religions’ beliefs as contradictory rather than contrary is a choice dependent on such 
exaggerations. On the ancient South Asian parable of the Blind Men and the Elephant, retold by 
the Sufi mystic Rumi, had the men been given sight on their partial views of the Absolute, ‘they 
would have found there were no contradictions between their words.’ Aydin argues that not just 
for Rumi, but in the Hebrew bible and also on Quranic ground, “There is a taste of Divine Being 
in the heart/soul of every religious community” (224). 
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28 Unreliability can be cast at a level of more proximate causes, as we saw from contingency 
arguments in Chapter 2. That religious beliefs conflict, and that most religious believers 
themselves attribute falsehood to most religious beliefs, would seemingly be enough to establish 
unreliable mechanism if beliefs all rooted in a single source. Yet of course conformist fideists — 
those who assume the special authority of the home religion’s testimonial tradition —typically 
deny that their belief uptake is grounded in the same mechanism or doxastic method as those that 
produce all those beliefs they judge false. The level of generality at which (AS) describes the 
doxastic strategy (belief-forming function) they would hold to be too wide. But if plausible 
relevant difference reasoning is not forthcoming to support this reply, the position threatens to 
give up philosophical response, and to collapse into merely negative apologetics. 
 
29 Griffiths and Wilkins 2013, 143. On evolutionary debunking and moral and religious beliefs, 
see also M. Bergmann and P. Kain (eds.) (2014), Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief: 
Disagreement and Evolution. D. Enoch and E. Guttel (2010) also argue that we need a more 
nuanced understanding of the philosophical significance of debunking explanations. D. Leech 
and A. Visala (2012) nicely distinguish evolutionary from co-evolutionary and from cognitive 
explanations among naturalistic explanations of religion. 
 
30 Vainio, 96-97. I want to thank John Bishop for comments on a draft paper that steered me to 
focus on soteriological exclusivism as the more interesting target of philosophical interest. This 
is supported further by the fact that Griffiths (2001) defends mutualist salvific exclusivism, while 
interestingly enough finding doctrinal exclusivism unsustainable. Griffiths also makes use of the 
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open/closed exclusivism distinction (see also Marbaniang 2010, who says that fundamentalist 
faith evinces three epistemic conditions: unconditional subjection to authority, existential 
identity, and closed exclusivism, and also absolutist ethics and a utopian eschatology), but I find 
the open/closed distinction vague in its meaning and application to individuals. On the other 
hand, McKim (2012) supplies very detailed treatment of the overlaps and differences between 
doctrinal and soteriological exclusivism, and cogent critiques of both forms. 
 
31 Vainio’s characterization of exclusivism is suspect, since his account of it leaves out no moral 
requirements on heaven and the religion-specific cognitive components the salvific exclusivist 
insists upon. Salvific exclusivism is not “open” in the way that doctrinal exclusivism logically 
may be. For instance, escapism or potential universal salvation looks good from a perspective of 
moral theology, but in Paul’s treatment of works of the flesh for instance, he insists that “those 
who do such things will not inherit the kingdom of God” (Galatians 5:22 – 23). Also, without the 
stronger salvific exclusivist riders, Jesus could have served to redeem human sin, regardless of 
whether his life and teachings were actually remembered and honoured, or he was forgotten.  
 
32 For example, “Because of our cognitive biases, we often have a comfortable default position, 
which resists change. An open-minded person is able to transcend this… open-mindedness 
entails that we must sometimes remain in a state of uncertainty….” (158). Everyone probably 
thinks of themselves as open-minded, but under the supplied description this is not something  
most exclusivists endorse or live up to, as least as I read them, since the models of faith they 
adhere to call explicitly for resistance to change, and for conceiving faith as immune to standing 
intellectual uncertainty, or momentary wavering into doubt. 
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33 “We call an argument which links true belief with pragmatic success a “Milvian bridge” 
(recalling how Constantine’s victory in the battle by that name was traditionally ascribed to the 
truth of his Christian beliefs, and the falsity of his enemies’ beliefs)…. Milvian bridge: X facts 
are related to the evolutionary success of X beliefs in such a way that it is reasonable to accept 
that and act on X beliefs produced by our evolved cognitive faculties” (134). But at the same 
time, Griffiths and Wilkins take those would-be debunkers of religious belief to task who simply 
dichotomize between truth-tracking and fitness tracking in order to argue that the evolutionary 
fitness of religious beliefs is wholly independent of truth. The idea of domains where there is or 
isn’t such a “bridge,” nicely corrects for the dichotomizing tendency Vainio alleges to find in 
CSR. 
 
34 Griffiths and Wilkins 2013, 136-137. Note that this author, Paul E. Griffiths is not Paul I. 
Griffiths, the Christian thinker whose apologetics for exclusivism we previously critiqued. 
 
35 Griffiths and Wilkins, 144. See also Griffiths and Wilkins 2010. 
 
36 “If the explanation shows either that X’s belief in the claims P is due to an unreliable 
mechanism or that X would have been likely to believe the claims P whatever their truth – value, 
then X’s beliefs do not amount to knowledge.” (Pigden, “Subversive Explanations” (2013), 147; 
see also Nola’s “Do Naturalistic Explanations of Religious Beliefs Debunk Religion?” in the 
same volume). 
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37 This idea about asymmetry of content (religious multiplicity or diversity) manifesting out of 
symmetry of process of belief-uptake does not seem to have been carried out by Kitcher, but I 
would argue that it is complementary with Kitcher’s articulation of a naturalistic and humanistic 
worldview. Kitcher’s humanism allows the reasonableness of alternative religious orientations. I 
agree with Kitcher most when he targets his criticism on the Belief Model of faith, while 
allowing reasonable agents other models that do not so much incite bigotries or religious 
intolerance, or conflict with science. 
 
38 In the laboratory setting, with variables controlled as far as possible, and auxiliary conditions 
are adequately independent, if the hypothesis predicts something and it isn’t observed, it simply 
isn’t there. In science there are few quick kills, and tenacity can be a personal virtue where 
synchronic theory virtues do not supply a definitive choice among competing theories; 
adjustments to auxiliary assumptions or tweaks to the hypothesis might work, but if ad hoc 
adjustments continue to be made this tends to rob the hypothesis of its testable empirical content 
rather than increases it as is what happens in progressive research programs of any kind (Imre 
Lakatos). And what, after all, is more ad hoc than, in response to a call for explanation of an 
asymmetrical ascription of good religious luck, explaining it in terms of another? But it may be 
different in religion because the singular proposition, “God exists” is not expected to be 
verifiable by the five senses. If I tell you, “I have a green genie in my briefcase,” and my class 
then dissects my briefcase and no one finds any trace of it, it will not help that I tell my class, “It 
is an invisible green genie.” Unless highly credulous, they will be green genie atheists, not green 
genie agnostics. Ditto with what you think about weapons of mass destruction under Saddam 
Hussein Iraq: holding out that there might be WMDs there naturally-enough gave way to overt 
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skepticism, given the strong but failed efforts to locate them. How different is it with evidencing 
theistic claims, or classes of supernatural event claims, such as miracles? Does absences of 
evidence ever legitimately become evidence of absence? I have no definite thesis on this, but the 
inference would seem to be much sounder if there is also a naturalistic story to tell about how 
these beliefs arise in people, and would arise, even if they are not true. 
 
39 Later Enlightenment figures who were skeptical of special revelation took this from Hume. 
Thomas Paine wrote that “It is revelation to the first person only, and hearsay to every other, and 
consequently [these others] are not obliged to believe it.” Paine (1967) [1776], 292-293. 
 
40 All Hume quotes are from Enquiry, Section 10, ‘Of Miracles.’ 
 
41 The performance of miracles as proof of divine connection is often demanded by characters in 
Abrahamic narratives. The performance of miracles for the confirmation of faith is a repeated 
trope, though attitudes vary from ecstatic reception to being critical of a ‘Doubting Thomas’ for 
his unfaith, and from prophets pleased to show God’s power through them, to prophets who 
refuse to perform them precisely when others ask or demand it of them as proof.  Historical-
critical methods point to another and more subtle form of persuasion. They raise concerns about 
prefiguration in miracle stories. For example, Jesus in some gospel accounts repeatedly does 
things that the intended readership would recognize as the fulfillment of older Jewish prophesy 
of a coming messiah. This suggests a persuasive intent on the part of the authors; for New 
Testament readers may be seen as the most significant of Jesus’ miracles. Events that (whether 
through conscious prefiguration or not) confirm an older prophesy function to legitimize the 
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narrative of a new covenant with God, and they add an intellectual element to the ever-present 
persuasive role in miracles in instilling faith. 
 
42 I am not here offering a full account of the relation between the de jure and de facto, either in 
regards to miracle claims, or to luck-leaning asymmetric religious trait-ascriptions. I can just 
summarize some of the questions to ask. One is, ‘Under what conditions does absence of 
evidence comport to rationally sufficient evidence of absence?’ On the one hand, there is the 
appeal to ignorance fallacy. On the other hand, we know that in science and everyday life, 
absence of evidence after careful and prolonged efforts at inquiry, and especially under 
controlled conditions where we do our best to eliminate hidden variables, does typically comport 
to evidence of absence.  
 
43 De Cruz, “the relevance of Hume's natural history of religion for cognitive science of 
religion.” Res Philosophica. 
 
44 The epistemological literature agrees Dani Rabinowitz that, “In some cases sensitivity is the 
more stringent condition, while in others safety is….[T]he following pair of conditionals are 
false: If S safely believes P then S sensitively believes P; If S sensitively believes P then S safely 
believes P.  The logic of these conditionals makes explicit the respects in which safety is similar 
to and different from the sensitivity condition.” “The Safety Condition on Knowledge,” Internet 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://www.iep.utm.edu/safety-c/ Accessed June 10, 2018. 
Part of what I am saying connects sensitivity failure to truth-aptness considerations is supplied 
by understanding that the scope of the sensitivity condition does not extend to necessary truths or 
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to knowing the falsity of radical skeptical scenarios. The condition is thus limited to, but also 
especially illuminative of, rational justification for “contingently true propositions.” These points 
hold whether sensitivity is a necessary condition on knowing or not (as a virtue epistemologist, I 
think an aretaic conditions serves better, but that sensitivity concerns are nevertheless important 
especially in regard to environmental epistemic luck). The insensitivity of belief and cognitive 
overdetermination, in the form of what John K. Davis calls trait-dependent belief, are also linked. 
I develop these connections further in Axtell, 2019. 
 
45 Brian C. Barnett (2019) provides a strong discussion of the debate. He also supports the 
conclusion that Plantinga’s General Reduction Argument fails, and therefore that “theists must 
deal with each de jure objection one at a time, and independently of the de facto objection” (14). 
An example of skeptical evidentialists who make quite sweeping de jure objections to theistic 
belief, see Todd Long (2010). By contrast I think that a sweeping de facto objection (for 
instance, that that are no sound miracle claims, or no special revelations) is better motivated than 
a claim that everyone must be irrational who believes such a thing. I believe many 
Enlightenment thinkers (for example Thomas Paine, or Voltaire) made both de jure and de facto 
claims, but didn’t confuse them in the ways that modern-day impermissivism will drive one to 
do. On this view one might possibly still move from the one kind of argument to the other, but 
not without a clear argument: de jure and de facto arguments are to be constructed with as much 
independence from one another as they can, unless one is quite explicitly trying to argue for an 
entailment. Entailment from de jure to de facto might be exampled in one’s arguing the ‘mutual 
destruction’ of miracle claims in different religions. It is possible that the one’s we have studied 
as ill-founded but others are well-founded, but it is more likely that they are all false claims, not 
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just some. Entailment from de facto to de jure might be exampled in the “unfriendly” inference 
from there is no proof positive for God’s existence, all people are “irrational” who believe that 
God exists. These are just schematic examples. 
 
46 Bishop and Aijaz’s account is clearly closest to my own, and I develop a character-focused 
and neo-Jamesian permissivism in Axtell 2015 and Axtell 2019. Bishop and Aijaz’s (2004) aims 
“(1) to argue that Alvin Plantinga’s Reformed epistemology does not provide a categorical 
affirmative answer to the ‘de jure question’ about Christian belief; (2) to argue that – on the 
assumption that our total independent evidence leaves it open whether Christian belief is true or 
false – a categorical affirmative answer to the de jure question requires defending doxastic 
venture in favour of Christian belief; and (3) to suggest that PRE’s appeal to epistemological 
externalism may play a significant role in defending the epistemic propriety of doxastic venture 
in favour of Christian belief. On (3), the authors were correct to concede to Buckareff (2005) that 
a venture of faith might sometimes be sub-doxastic, so long as “full practical commitment” can 
still be made to faith-propositions without actual belief. For further debate with Bishop and 
Aijaz’s thesis, see Griffeon 2015.  
 
47 Wittgenstein, 56. 
 
48 Wittgenstein continues, “What we call believing in a Judgement Day or not believing in a 
Judgement Day – The expression of belief may play an absolutely minor role.  
If you ask me whether or not I believe in a Judgement Day, in the sense in which religious 
people have belief in it, I wouldn’t say: ‘No. I don’t believe there will be such a thing.’ It would 
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seem to me utterly crazy to say this.  And then I give an explanation: ‘I don’t believe in ...’, but 
then the religious person never believes what I describe. I can’t say. I can’t contradict that 
person” (57). “In one sense, I understand all he says – the English words ‘God’, ‘separate’, etc. I 
understand. I could say: ‘I don’t believe in this,’ and this would be true, meaning I haven’t got 
these thoughts or anything that hangs together with them. But not that I could contradict the 
thing.” 
 
49 Wittgenstein, 57, 59. 
 
50 “Here we are distinguishing between the views of those who think that they need not rest on 
the evidential basis and those who hold the far more radical belief that faith needs neither 
evidences nor the facts themselves” (Gary Habermas, 1991). 
 
51 Overdetermination theory is still a largely unexplored approach in debates over the basing 
relationship. But it is motivated by the holistic nature of people’s reasoning about worldview 
beliefs, and under conditions of uncertainty and other pragmatic constraints, as Rawls alerted us 
to. It is motivated also, we have now seen, by some specific psychological studies, research that 
illuminates how trait-dependent judgment contributes to psychographic contrariety. See Axtell 
2019 for development. 
 
52 A further paper by Leeuwen (2007) argues that self-deception does not typically result in 
“belief” but in “avowed belief.” Since CSR is interested in popular religiosity and theological 
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incorrectness, there are some rich CSR connections here as well, and Leeuwen develops them to 
a degree. 
 
53 This language, though, might be confusing, since many epistemologists of internalist and 
probabilist orientation use “credence” as an evidence-based confidence level, such as .6. 
Compare Lara Buchak (2014), who nicely tries to mediate what she sees as two robust traditions 
that dealing with doxastic attitudes. In our terms, the one tradition focuses on the etiologically 
and axiologically deep (Leeuwen), while the other, the probabilistic tradition, focuses on the 
shallow side of Table 1. Still, Leeuwen and Buchak might both endorse what Carter, Jarvis, and 
Rubin (2016) refer to as “doxastic state pluralism,” and I accept this latter as an essential aspect 
of the epistemology of controversial views. 
 
54 Leeuwen’s distinction seems related to the better-known distinction between “sensory” and 
“emotional” experience. On the latter, Foresman, Fosl and Watson (2017) note that many of our 
beliefs are formed on the basis of both kinds of experience. They remind us of Montaigne’s 
claim “What we see and hear when we are transported with emotion we neither see nor hear as it 
is.”  Some thinkers and traditions disparage emotional experience as evidence in epistemic or 
critical matters, while others (James, for example) champion it. Realistically, “even if we are 
suspicious of the role emotional experience plays in reasoning we cannot completely eradicate 
it” (234). For Foresman et. al., it is important first that we distinguish them rather than conflating 
them, and then that we assess carefully: “Emotional experience refers to our affective impression 
of all those things that are brought into our perception through our senses…. There are a number 
of similarities between these two types of feeling [sensory and emotional]. First, both happen 
109 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
independently of our wills; …Secondly, both kinds of feeling happen  largely independently of 
conscious, critical judgments we make about them….Despite the similarities between sense 
experience and emotion, there are strong reasons for distinguishing them… [including that] the 
content of sense experience is about a different type of reality from emotions. Experience seems 
to direct our attention to something outside of ourselves, which may or may not be presented to 
us accurately …. The content of our emotions, however, seems to be about something quite 
different. For the most part, the content of emotions seems to be to something inside us….” 
(222).  
 
55 Leeuwen 2014, 698. 
 
56 Buckareff (2005) argues that faith is best conceived of as a sub-doxastic venture, and 
that “Bishop fails adequately to show that faith in the face of inadequate epistemic reasons for 
believing is, or can even be, a uniquely doxastic venture.” Bishop (2005) responds that “it is 
indeed impossible intentionally and directly to acquire a belief one judges not to be supported by 
one's evidence. But Jamesian doxastic venture does not involve any such direct self-inducing of 
belief: it is rather a matter of an agent's taking to be true in practical reasoning what she already, 
through some ‘passional’, non-epistemic, cause, holds true beyond the support of her evidence.” 
Eklund (2014) updates this debate. 
 
57 At least where we are focusing on problems with theological methods on which having faith 
mean believing the factual truth of narrative events in scripture, the foremost problem is that 
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agents may actually be conflating cognitive states if the states they self-report having are 
emotionally-charged or held above challenge or serious revision. 
 
58 Leeuwen’s project like my own is not well-aided by the generic scales of religiosity and 
spirituality the psychologists have often applied, but suggests a need for more detailed scales, 
informed by theory. But cognitive scientists already recognize that avowals cannot simply be 
taken at face value. Studies of differences between explicit measures of religiosity such as self-
reports and implicit measures throw some light on that subject. This firstly goes to the question 
of whether one can believe theological claims that they may not actually understand. It secondly 
goes to the CSR distinction between times when “theologically correct” beliefs are maintained to 
people, and times when they tend to slide back into theologically incorrect” assertions, for 
example, in more “freely elaborated” or anthropomorphic claims about godhead. 
 
59 Van Leeuwen writes that “This theory locates religious credence and factual belief in relation 
to other cognitive attitudes, like fictional imagining, hypothesis, acceptance in a context, and 
assumption for the sake of argument,” and he argues that “religious credence has key features in 
common with these latter attitudes that that distinguish them from factual belief” (2014, 699). 
Among these features that religious credence shares with fictional imagining and other secondary 
cognitive attitudes is that that they are not typically held to “norms of truth and evidence” (712). 
 
60 Does being self-deceived that p entail believing that p? Leeuwen cites Robert Audi for this 
revisionary claim that Leeuwen himself rejects. But he defines avowal as “a tendency to affirm 
verbally (both privately and publicly) that lacks normal belief-like connections to non-verbal 
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actions” (2007, 419). My account is neutral on this debate and on the question of whether or not 
a bias, for instance ethnocentrism, involves believing certain things to be true. I hope my use of 
“avowal” as a general term that could be cognitive or non-cognitive, doxastic or sub-doxastic, 
doesn’t confuse my description of Leeuwen’s views. 
 
61 After all, the models of faith that most highly insist upon “belief” but exhibit the Epistemic 
Tension are also the models of faith that support a Conflict model of the relationship between 
faith and reason. Proponents of Conflict, whether of the biblical literalist or aggressive atheist 
sort, agree that religions make overt empirical truth claims; the only question is whether these 
claims are factually true or not. Conflict is to be avoided where possible, and Leeuwen’s 
proposed distinction is a step in that direction. 
 
62 Leeuwen 2014, 711. 
 
63  Leeuwen 2014, 713. 
 
64 McCauley and Whitehouse, 2. Compare Sorensen: “We need to address the universal 
questions raised above and this cannot be done by means of localised interpretations. Further, 
explanatory theories not only enable us to address such general questions but also to fertilise 
local interpretations by supplying a more solid terminological grounding and presenting new 
potential lines of enquiry. All interpretations are theory-dependent and the more explicit the 
theories are, the better. Thus the cognitive science of religion does not reject the role of 
interpretation in the academic study of religion, but merely attempts to right an unbalance by 
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insisting on the necessity of explanatory theories” (2005, 467). Sorensen insists that public 
representations are only one side of the coin, and that “keeping universal cognitive mechanisms 
in mind can help historians avoid historical exoticism, in the same way as it helps 
anthropologists avoid cultural exoticism.”  
 
65 This idea together with some aspects of HADD are anticipated in Hume’s observation that, 
“we have a strong disposition to read mentality into what is not really mental. Thus, we tend to 
treat these unknown causes as agents to be appeased” (Hume 1993, 141). 
 
66 Brunner 1937, 155. See Blanshard for critical commentary. 
 
67 Perhaps extending from Paul (1 Corinthians 1:23), the strong fideism of Tertullian informed 
his ironic claim, “The most ignorant peasant under the Christian dispensation possesses more 
real knowledge than the wisest of ancient philosophers” (Apologeticus).  
 
68 Sorensen 2005, 487-88. 
 
69 For example with SAST Effects, priming a subject might be on the lines of Leeuwen’s point 
(2014) that cognitive attitudes are attributed to what is “evidentially vulnerable” and subjection 
to “general cognitive governance.” Test subjects can be primed to acknowledge this with respect 
to other people’s beliefs, before being asked about their own. If their reports about their own 
faith-based precepts are revealed by subsequent self-reports to be evidentially invulnerable and 
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to lack general cognitive governance characteristic of belief, then the subject is displaying SAST 
Effects. 
 
70 Tasks for measuring attitudes towards inductive risk include religious versions of tasks and the 
well-known assimilation bias: the tendency to favorably interpret and evaluate information that 
supports their existing beliefs (Jong, 69). They might include covert measures of belief that x, 
where x accords or breaks with inductive norms. 
 
71 There are numerous relations between counter-intuitive, counter-evidential, counter-schematic 
ideas, and counter-inductive thinking or inference. While I have focused only on the latter, 
counter-schematic ideas are absurd, and potentially a test of weak inductive inferences: causal, 
generalizing, or analogical/disanalogical.  
 
72 James, the 1896 Preface to James’ The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular 
Philosophy.  
 
73 This, despite how often members of both groups –epistemologists and theologians– seem to 
unite in principled opposition to James spirit of inner tolerance. Decades later, James would 
respond to his critics, secular and theistic, who accused him of ‘preaching reckless faith’: “I have 
preached the right of the individual to indulge his personal faith at his personal risk. I have 
discussed the kinds of risk; I have contended that none of us escape all of them; and I have only 
preached that it is better to face them open-eyed than to act as if we did not know them to be 
there.” Quoted in Bruce Kuklick’s introduction to James’s Pragmatism (1907, xv). While I do 
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not find James’s version of permissivism is adequately risk-averse (see Axtell 2018 for my 
critique, and compare Aikin and Talisse 2018) I think this permissivism-with-teeth is on the right 
track.  
